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INTRODUCTION
Modem antitrust jurisprudence has rested on the assumption that all firms are rational and that rational firms seek to
maximize profit.' This assumption does not command unanimous assent among academics, but its explanatory power and
practical advantages have enabled it to survive generations of
debate about the proper focus of competition policy and to embed
itself deep within antitrust doctrine. 2 By coherently explaining
a wide variety of business behavior, from pricing decisions to
vertical integration and mergers, the rationality assumption has
unified antitrust theory and enabled triers of fact to avoid making individualized assessments of corporate motives and abilities that would cripple antitrust administration.
Over the past few years, federal courts have mounted an indirect attack on the rationality assumption. A growing number
of these courts have acknowledged the existence of "sophisticated" firms and concluded that these super-rational companies
can control market dynamics more profoundly than their merely
rational counterparts. Several courts have held that the presence of large, sophisticated buyers in post-merger markets can
legitimize otherwise unlawful seller-side mergers. 3 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declared that
sophisticated suppliers can deter their powerful buyers from
overcharging consumers. 4 Most significantly, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,5 the United States
Supreme Court recently suggested that sophisticated firms can
6
neutralize market power, the main focus of antitrust concern.
These cases introduce a doctrine that divides the corporate
world in two. On one side are firms of average rationality that,
even when they are large and wealthy, possess relatively limited
power to affect competition. On the other side are sophisticated
firms, whose tactical expertise, knowledgeability, or intelligence
1. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing the rationality
assumption).

2. See infranotes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing the rationality
assumption's relation to antitrust).

3. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (noting cases).
4. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1990).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
6. Although the Supreme Court rejected the argument that sophisticated
buyers deprived Kodak of market power, it accepted the principle that in certain markets sophisticated buyers can counteract the market power of dominant sellers. Id. at 2080-88; see also infra text accompanying notes 42-63
(discussing Kodak). For a more complete discussion of market power, see discussion infra accompanying notes 43-44, 83-88.
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enable them to combat their competitors' market power more effectively than their merely rational counterparts.
Sophistication does not, however, define itself. Courts must
distinguish sophisticated firms from rational firms by describing
those characteristics that set the former group apart. By requiring courts to differentiate firms on the basis of sophistication,
and thus requiring courts to define and identify this trait, sophistication doctrine sacrifices the rationality assumption in
favor of an empirical, improvisational approach to corporate
behavior.
Surprisingly, the emergence of sophistication doctrine has
attracted neither judicial dissent nor academic criticism. 7 Without questioning its transformative implications, courts and commentators have blithely accepted the premise that courts can
intelligently classify firms as "sophisticated" or "rational," identify the special qualities of sophisticates, and incorporate these
qualities into coherent and practicable legal principles. Sophistication analysis deserves closer examination. In a short time it
has reshaped merger law and contains the potential ultimately
to alter the basic premises of antitrust doctrine.
This Article critically examines the new sophistication. It
first describes how the assumption of uniform rationality organizes antitrust, analyzes the destablizing implications of a
firm-specific approach to rationality, and discusses how, by eroding the uniform rationality assumption, sophistication doctrine
undercuts the economic philosophy of antitrust. After discussing the intractable problems of defining sophistication, as well
as its methodological and administrative consequences, the Article attempts to explain why, in spite of its serious problems,
sophistication doctrine has risen so rapidly to doctrinal
prominence.
The Article suggests that courts have overlooked the
7. Scholarly discussion has confined itself to reproving merger courts for
underestimating strategic options available to sophisticated buyers. Using the
Coase theorem to postulate post-merger strategies available to presumably sophisticated buyers, Professor Hovenkamp has criticized recent courts for ignoring the possibility that sophisticated buyers might maximize profits not by
competing with dominant sellers, but by colluding with them to charge consumers monopoly prices and dividing the spoils. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 293, 315-16 (1992); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1369, 1374-76 (1991). Similarly, in the 1993 Supplement to their treatise, Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp mention the sophisticated buyer defense, but make no claim that it
poses problems either for merger analysis or antitrust generally. See PHnLU1 E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAmp, ANrrrRusT LAw T 918 (Supp. 1993).
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problems of sophistication because sophistication doctrine fits
the times. Superficially, the concept of corporate sophistication
resembles strategic models of firm behavior proposed by postChicago economists, an emerging school whose game-theoretic
approach has found favor in many areas of law.8 Sophistication
doctrine also mirrors the hyper-complex tests announced in recent antitrust opinions of the Supreme Court.9 These developments, the Article argues, may explain the emergence of
sophistication but fail to justify it.
After criticizing the impracticability of the post-Chicago
models and the Court's new tests, the Article concludes that sophistication fails. The doctrine fails in part because of its complexity. Moreover, by embarking on a futile quest for the
meaning of corporate intelligence, sophistication doctrine destroys the rationality assumption. The loss of this assumption
deprives antitrust of its philosophical framework and condemns
it to sift without purpose or direction through an enormous array of facts. The main failure of sophistication doctrine thus lies
in its rejection of theoretical guidance, a rejection that ultimately underscores the jurisprudential virtues of elegant, organizing assumptions.
I. THE RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION AND THE
CHALLENGE OF CORPORATE SOPHISTICATION
For the past twenty years, since it began explicitly incorporating tenets of price theory, 10 antitrust law has assumed that
firms seek to maximize profits. Although this assumption lacks
empirical validation"- and runs counter to other theories of firm
behavior, 12 it nevertheless has proven extremely useful. Known
generally as the rationality assumption, the hypothesis of profit8. See infra notes 149-166 and accompanying text (discussing the postChicago school).
9. See infra part V.B.1 (discussing cases).
10. For the classic formulation of price theory, see generally GEORGE J.
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE

(1966).

11. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L.
REv. 815, 830 (1990).
12. Some have theorized that the limits of human kno~vledge and the natural temptation to follow proven patterns of behavior impel firms to act less than
optimally, "satisficing" instead of maximizing. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER
C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 113-16, 303-08
(1967); HERBERT SIMoN, ADnmmISTRATIvE BEHAVIOR 61-78 (1945); Robert G.
Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Ap.
proach,72 CAL. L. REv. 3, 28-29 (1984); Herbert Simon, RationalDecisionMaking in Business Organizations,69 AM. EcoN. REv. 493, 503 (1979).
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maximization presumes that people are both rational and selfinterested. As managers of firms, rational, self-interested peo13
ple pursue profit.
The rationality assumption does not purport to describe
how individual corporations actually behave. 14 Rather, it seeks
to predict commercial behavior from generalizations that incorporate real-world observations about the workings of firms and
markets.' 5 By furnishing a theoretical basis for predicting business behavior, the rationality assumption organizes antitrust.
Among other things, it accounts for pricing decisions of competitive and monopolistic firms,' 6 vertical integration,' 7 and the
inclination of firms to enter contestable markets. 18 The rationality assumption's explanatory scope is so broad that one antitrust commentator has referred to the assumption as
"ubiquitously normative." 19
The rationality assumption has an implicit corollary. This
corollary posits that firms are equally rational, that no firm pursues profit more intently or maximizes profit more effectively
than any other. Although this supposition is obviously counterfactual, until recently antitrust courts had tacitly accepted it.
They may have recognized intuitively that rejecting the equality
corollary would undermine the entire theory of rationality, be13. See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 827-31 (stating that although the
profit-maximization hypothesis is difficult to test empirically, it is a normative
convention generally accepted by economists without empirical proof). The integrity of the rationality assumption does not depend on universal profit-maximizing; it requires only that a few firms profit-maximize. These firms will grow
at the expense of others, eventually persuading the others either to maximize
profits or leave the market. See RIcHARD A. POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK,
ANTTrrusT: CASES, ECONoMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERLS 855-57 (2d ed.
1981). The rationality assumption has also been called the "theory of the firm."
See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 1, 6 (discussing the "theory of the firm").
14. See RicHAD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 16 (4th ed. 1992);
Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYs
TIvE EcoNoIcs 3 (1953).

IN

Posi-

15. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 4; Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 81718.
16. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 827-28.
17. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-98
(1937).
18. WILLIAm J.BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUsTRY STRucTUm 5 (1982). Economists define a perfectly contestable market as one (a) that is accessible to potential entrants, (b) that permits potential
entrants, without restriction, to meet the same market demands and use the
same production techniques as incumbent firms, and (c) whose post-entry profitability is evaluated by potential entrants at pre-entry prices. Id.
19. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 831.
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cause differing abilities to maximize profits imply the need for
legal rules responsive to such differences. A theory of differential rationality would complicate methodology, requiring courts
to measure corporate profitability, discount profitability for risk,
weigh the meaning and import of short-term unprofitability, and
invest all of this data with coherent, legal significance. Discarding the equality principle, therefore, would destroy the explanatory power of the rationality assumption, fragmenting antitrust
the methodological benefits of a
philosophy and eliminating
20
more theoretical approach.
Sophistication doctrine repudiates this fundamental principle of equal rationality, as recent merger law demonstrates. The
equality principle led pre-sophistication courts to view all firms
as equally inclined to perceive and pursue profitable opportunities in areas other than their own, and thus to enter markets
made uncompetitive by merger.2 1 Merger courts, however, have
20. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of administrative efficiency in antitrust litigation. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990) ("The administrative
efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling."); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that courts deem
certain practices per se unreasonable and so avoid "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation").
In other areas of federal law, courts have developed rules embodying concepts of corporate sophistication. The limited scope afforded those rules, however, has minimized their impact. More significantly, by defining sophistication
broadly and applying the "sophisticated" label to entire classes of firms, courts
in other areas have averted the methodological problems that accompany the
firm-specific inquiries for which antitrust courts have opted. For example,
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993) (protecting unregistered trademarks and trade dresses from infringement), courts have considered
sophistication as one factor among many bearing on the likelihood of buyer confusion. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir.) (listing factors affecting the successful marketing of a product, including
buyer sophistication), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). Courts have also defined sophistication tautologically as the quality ofnot being confused. See, e.g.,
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1111
(6th Cir. 1991) (observing that there is less likelihood of buyer confusion in a
sale of services to a sophisticated buyer, than to a typical buyer). Finally,
courts have applied the term categorically to all buyers of the product in question. See, e.g., Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
718 F.2d 1201, 1206 (1st Cir. 1983) (addressing the sophistication of the class of
prospective buyers of the subject medical equipment).
21. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964)
("The existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation
engaged in the same or other related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to
enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition
which cannot be underestimated."); see also FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d
901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that, although entry into the industrial
drug corn industry is slow, new entrants would enter to secure profit opportuni-
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lately rejected the notion of uniform rationality; the newly announced sophisticated-buyer defense deems average rationality
insufficient to prompt new entry and considers only large, so22
phisticated firms capable of entering certain markets.
Sophistication doctrine also changes the courts' analysis of
market power. Courts have long regarded corporate size and
23
market share as the essential preconditions of market power,
tempered only by structural considerations such as entry barriers.2 4 Because courts presumed that all firms were equally rational, actual rationality had no bearing on the market power
issue. Now, actual rationality matters. The Supreme Court recently imputed to large, sophisticated buyers the unique ability
to use their sophistication to neutralize their sellers' market
power.2 5 The Court thereby implied, for the first time, that
some firms are more rational than others and invested superrationality with analytical significance.
Together, these developments effectively describe sophistication as a new form of market power, but a form impossible to
ties even if that market were cartelized); Hospital Corp. ofAm. v. FTC, 807 F.2d
1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing non-proprietary hospitals' fears of mar-

ket entry by proprietary hospitals), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). Commentators skeptical about the strength of the rationality assumption take a
contrary position, arguing that because new entry entails the risk of failure,
and because corporate managers dread failure, firms enter new markets reluctantly, if at all. See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-MicroeconomicApproach to
Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 903-08 (1988)
(discussing firm behavior).
22. See United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 67980 (D. Minn. 1990); see also infra note 38 (citing additional cases).
23. Until 1992, the Supreme Court had defined market power exclusively
by reference to market share. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 17 (1984); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 501-04 (1969); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966);
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947); see also
infra notes 43-44, 83-88 (discussing market power).
24. Unlike the Supreme Court, some lower courts have considered factors
other than market share as indicative of market power. See, e.g., Ball Memorial
Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the ease of entry into relevant market diminishes the power normally inferable from high market share). Pervasive governmental regulation
has also been held to modify the ostensible power suggested by high market
share. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 692 F. Supp. 52, 69 (D.R.I. 1988) ("In a regulated industry, such as
health care insurance, a heavy reliance on market share statistics probably
would be an inaccurate or misleading indication of monopoly power."), aff'd,
883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1072 (1990).
25. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112. S. Ct. 2072,
2086-87 (1992).
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define. By positing superior corporate intelligence as a source of
commercial strength, sophistication doctrine explodes the useful
fiction of equal rationality and replaces it with complex investigations into the elusive facts of actual corporate intelligence.
These quixotic searches will confound antitrust, subverting its
logic and breeding numerous sub-inquiries, each inevitably inconclusive and all ultimately destructive of methodological simplicity and administrative efficiency.
II. THE RAPID EMERGENCE OF SOPHISTICATION
DOCTRINE
A.

THE SOPHISTICATED BUYER DEFENSE IN MERGER LAw

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly." 26 By eliminating a previously independent firm,

every merger reduces the number of competitors. Because a
market with fewer competitors, however, does not necessarily
lack competitive vitality-post-merger markets may retain
enough companies to remain highly competitive-antitrust enforcement agencies challenge only those mergers threatening
undue concentration.2 7 Nevertheless, highly concentrated markets permit leading firms to collude more easily on price and
output without committing a detectable violation of the rules
against price-fixing.2 8 Proof that a proposed merger will result
26. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
27. Merger courts have used either of two tests to measure market concentration. In the 1960s and '70s, the "Four Firm Concentration Ratio" (CR4) was
the predominant test. CR4 calculates market concentration by adding the
shares of the four largest firms. A "vague consensus" exists that a CR4 greater
than 75% promotes collusion. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAw § 11.3, at 301 (1985). The 1984 Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines employ a different measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HI), which squares the market share of each firm and then sums the squares.
Id. at 302. Unlike the CR4, the HI computes concentration by considering all
firms in the market and by assigning greater weight (through the squaring process) to larger firms. Id. The Justice Department's most recent merger guidelines, promulgated in 1992, regard markets with post-merger HHIs below 1000
as unconcentrated; those with HHIs between 1000 and 1800 as moderately con-

centrated; and those over 1800 as highly concentrated. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.

(CCH) 9 13,104, at 20,569, 20,573-5 (Apr. 7, 1992).
28. FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989). Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988), both forbid price-fixing. Since the
publication of George Stigler's theory of oligopolistic collusion, see GEORGE J.
STIGLER,

A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE

ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY

39 (1968),

merger challenges have focused on the prospect of post-merger collusion in the
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in a highly concentrated market thus establishes a rebuttable
presumption2 9 that the merger will substantially lessen
competition.
Defendants can rebut this presumption by showing that increased concentration will not unduly reduce the market's competitiveness. 30 A defendant may, for instance, argue that likely
entry by companies outside the market would guarantee continued post-merger competitiveness. 3 1 When post-merger entry is
(or is perceived to be) sufficiently easy, courts have reasoned
that dominant, post-merger firms will refrain from organizing
price-fixing cartels, because such firms will fear that high prices
may attract new entry; prices will therefore stay closer to competitive levels.3 2 Thus, the federal government's most recent
defendants' market. By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s, merger courts and
enforcement agencies feared the impact of mergers on small business and the
possibility that even small mergers would produce large and powerful monopolists. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966)
('Thus, where concentration is gaining momentum in a market, we must be
alert to carry out Congress' intent to protect competition against ever-increasing concentrations through mergers."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("We cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.").
29. See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120-22
(1975); United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); see
also United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(stating that once the government shows the transaction will result in undue
concentration, the burden of production shifts to the defendant).
30. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 631
(1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,494-504 (1974);
PhiladelphiaNatl Bank, 374 U.S. at 363; FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc.,
754 F. Supp. 669, 678 (D. Minn. 1990).
31. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. at 120-22; General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. at 503-04; PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363-67; see also

Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 982 (accepting the district court's finding that
the defendants had rebutted the prima facie case).
"[Tihat a variety of factors other than ease of entry can rebut a prima facie
case has become hornbook law." Baker Hughes, Inc. 908 F.2d at 985. Among
those factors are the prospect of efficiencies from the merger, excess capacity,
degree of product homogeneity, marketing and sales methods, industry structure, weakness of data underlying the prima facie case, high elasticity of industry demand, and high cross-elasticity of supply and demand. Id. (citing AREEDA
& HOvENKAmp, supra note 7, 9 919, 920.1, 921, 925, 934-35, 939, at 813-23);
HOVENKNp, supra note 27, § 11.6, at 307-11; LAwRENCE A. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST § 204, at 622-25 (1977).
32. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33
(1973) (discussing a potential entrants beneficial effect on the New England
beer market); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964)
("[P]otential competition ... as a substitute for... [actual competition] may
restrain producers from overcharging those to whom they sell or underpaying
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Merger Guidelines recognize that where entry is easy, a proposed merger "raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily re33
quires no further analysis."
Until recently, courts employed a standard methodology for
analyzing the likelihood of post-merger entry. They examined
barriers to entering the market 3 4 and, if these barriers were not
prohibitively high, asked whether potential entrants had sufficient resources to compete effectively in the post-merger market. 3 5 The courts assumed that, absent significant entry
barriers, powerful, interested firms would either enter markets
that supra-competitive prices have distorted, or, as potential entrants, dissuade incumbents from initiating post-merger price
increases that could jeopardize their dominance.3 6 The opportunity for profit, courts reasoned, would
entice at least some large
37
firms to enter contestable markets.
those from whom they buy.") (citation and internal quotations omitted); Brown
Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 321-22 (noting ease of entry as factor in gauging Clayton
Act violation). See generally PHIL= AREEDA & Louis KAPLow, ANITRUST ANALYsis IT 530-531, at 881-85 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing conglomerate mergers and
the elimination of potential competition). Commentators specify two kinds of
potential competition, "perceived potential competition" and "actual potential
competition." Id. 1 531, at 882-83. The former describes firms that do not sell
in a particular market but would do so if the market price were higher; the
latter describes firms that will enter the market in the future even if the market price does not rise. PosNER, supra note 14, at 303.
33. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTIcE MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 27,
§ 3.0, at 20,573-10.
34. Economists define entry barriers generally as differentials in the longterm costs of production between incumbent firms and would-be entrants. See
STiGLER, supra note 28, at 67-70; Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM.
EcoN. REv. 47, 47 (1982). In particular, they regard entry-barriers as factors
that either foreclose new entry entirely or make the cost of doing business
higher for new entrants than for existing firms. 4 PHULLp AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 917, at 85 (1980); HovENKAMP, supra note 27, § 11.6,
at 305. Entry barriers include government regulations restricting entry, control by incumbents of patents required for manufacture, higher costs of capital
for new entrants, and limited access to scarce, non-duplicable resources. 4
AREEDA & TURNER, supra, 917, at 85; HovENKAmP, supra note 27, § 11.6, at
306; see also Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1427-28
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that anticompetitive conduct by one firm against another is not a barrier to entry and defining barriers to entry), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1307 (1994).
35. See FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D.D.C. 1986); see
also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 633 (1974)
(describing NBC's interest as a potential entrant into, and effect on, the Spokane commercial banking market); Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 527,
533-36 (describing Falstaff's interest as a potential entrant into, and effect on,
the highly-concentrated New England beer market).
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
37. In contexts other than entry analysis, merger courts have observed
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Beginning in 1990, several courts recast the traditional assumptions about post-merger entry. Declaring that the presence of powerful and "sophisticated" buyers could legitimize
otherwise unlawful seller-side mergers, 38 they analyzed the
likelihood of entry not only in terms of corporate power, but in
terms of "sophistication." Some suggested that only powerful,
sophisticated buyers would enter their sellers' markets if postmerger price collusion raised sellers' prices to monopolistic
levels.3 9 Others found that the unique tactical expertise of
that powerful buyers force dominant sellers to price competitively, even in
highly concentrated post-merger markets. See, e.g., FTC v. University Health,
Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 n.13 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[Cloncentration on the buying
side of a market does inhibit collusion."); Hospital Corp. ofAm. v. FTC, 807 F.2d
1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "the bigger a buyer is, the more easily
and lucratively a member of the [seller's] cartel can cheat on his fellows"), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). The easier it is to cheat on a cartel, courts have
observed, the more likely it is that cheating will occur, through secret price
reductions, for example. The more secret the price reductions, the weaker the
cartel and the more competitive the market. See University Health, Inc., 938
F.2d at 1213 n.13; Hospital Corp. of Am., 807 F.2d at 1391; see also STIGLER,
supra note 28, at 39, 43-44 (outlining the difficulties in maintaining secret price
reductions). These observations have led courts to conclude that the presence of
powerful buyers in post-merger markets should permit sellers to merge to
higher concentrations than would otherwise be permissible. See HospitalCorp.
of Am., 807 F.2d at 1391; Owens-Illinois,Inc., [1987-1993 Complaints & Orders
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 23,162, at 22,810, 22,823-24 (Feb.
26, 1992).
38. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir.
1990), aff'g 731 F. Supp. 3, 8-11 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1422-23 (S.D. Iowa 1991); FTC v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,239, at 64,852, 64,855 (D.D.C.
Aug. 27, 1990); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669,
679-80 (D. Minn. 1990); cf FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1213
n.13 (recognizing the sophisticated buyer defense, but rejecting its applicability
to the facts); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064,1085 (D. Del.
1991) (recognizing the sophisticated buyer defense, but rejecting its applicability to the facts; stating that the presence of sophisticated buyers is "not sufficient" to offset "anti-competitive effects" of a merger).
39. See Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 669-81. In Country Lake
Foods,the government unsuccessfully challenged an attempt by a large processor of fluid milk to acquire a competitor. Id. at 675-81. Defendant's buyers,
large wholesale food distributors, were even more concentrated than the milk
processors, controlling 90% of the wholesale milk market. Id. at 679. Defendant argued that its buyers "monitor milk prices closely and are generally very
sophisticated" and would therefore immediately protest price increases by defendant "not related to normal market conditions" and, if necessary, could integrate vertically into the fluid milk processing market. Id. at 674. Although the
court declared the possibility of such integration "[inisufficient of itself" to rebut the presumption of diminished competition, it found the argument and evidence about vertical integration to be "credible," and was persuaded by this,
and other evidence, to permit the merger. Id. at 680.
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large, sophisticated buyers could forestall monopoly pricing in
highly concentrated post-merger markets and thus maintain
40
their competitive vitality.
Some courts rejected the new sophisticated-buyer defense,
but strictly on factual grounds. 4 1 None questioned the principle
that sophisticated buyers possess distinctive talents for maintaining competition. None doubted that buyer sophistication
warranted special antitrust treatment. None expressed any reservations about the judiciary's ability to define and apply sophistication doctrine.

B.

SOPHISTICATION AND MARKET POWER

In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services
Inc.,42 the Supreme Court redefined the test of market pow40. See BakerHughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 986 (finding that sophisticated buyers can forestall monopoly pricing in highly concentrated post-merger markets
by "closely examin[ing] available options and... insist[ing] on receiving multiple, confidential bids for each order"); Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo., 781 F. Supp.
at 1422. In Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo. the court stated:
Buyers have successfully used a variety of tactics to obtain low prices
from.., suppliers, including playing off suppliers against one another,
swinging volume back and forth among suppliers, disciplining sellers
by cutting them off entirely, successfully insisting on year long or
multi-year ... agreements and holding out the threat of inducing a
new entrant [to compete against the suppliers].
781 F. Supp. at 1422.
41. See, e.g., University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1213 n.13 (stating that
certain health insurance companies were not "truly large buyers" and were
therefore insufficiently powerful, despite their sophistication, to prevent defendant hospital from conspiring post-merger to fix price); United Tote, Inc., 768
F. Supp. at 1085 (stating that the market contained sophisticated buyers, but
not enough "to offset the anti-competitive effects of the merger").
42. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). Plaintiffs in Kodak, independent service organizations (ISOs) that repaired and maintained Kodak copying and micrographic
equipment, complained that Kodak violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act by unlawfully tying the sale of service to the sale of replacement parts and
by monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the service market for Kodak
machinery. Id. at 2076. According to the ISOs, after obtaining nearly complete
control over Kodak replacement parts, Kodak refused to sell those parts to Kodak owners that hired ISOs, a decision that effectively forced Kodak owners to
cease dealing with ISOs. Id. at 2077. The District Court granted Kodak summary judgment on both counts of the complaint. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), 68,402, at 60,210, 60,211-14
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct.
2072 (1992). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
despite Kodak's conceded lack of power in the primary equipment markets, the
possibility of "market imperfections" raised a factual question about whether
Kodak possessed enough power in replacement parts to force some customers to
purchase its own service. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
903 F.2d 612, 616-18 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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er.4 3 Discarding its long-standing reliance on market share as a

proxy for power,44 the Court held that competitors' information
gaps regarding one firm's product could supply that firm with
market power, no matter how small its market share. 45 In the
process, the Court observed that powerful, "sophisticated" pur46
chasers could neutralize this new source of market power.
43. The Supreme Court has repeatedly defined market power as the ability
of a firm or group offirms to raise price or exclude competition. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986) (defining
market power as the "power to set higher than competitive prices" and to sustain such prices "long enough to earn in excess profits what they earlier gave up
in below-cost prices"); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (defining market power as "the ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market). Because
antitrust strives to protect against the misuse or wrongful acquisition of such
power, "the concept of market power is at the core of antitrust." George A. Hay,
Market Power in Antitrust, 60 AN~rrusr L.J. 807, 807 (1992). The standard
method of proving market share is fairly simple. It involves "first defining a
relevant [product and geographic] market in which to compute the defendant's
market share, next computing that share, and then deciding whether it is large
enough to support an inference of the required degree of market power." William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARv. L. REV. 937, 938 (1981).
44. Market share has long served as a surrogate for market power. See,
e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding that a 90% market share constitutes monopoly power, a 33% share
does not, and a 60-64% share is "doubtful"). Although the Supreme Court has
never expressly endorsed the market share proxy, before Kodak it consistently
regarded market share as the exclusive determinant of market power. See
supra note 23 (citing cases). In the past 15 years, some lower courts have widened the market power inquiry to include other factors, such as the strength of
consumer demand, the absence of effective entry barriers, and the apparent
vigor of interbrand competition. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (discounting large market
share when entry barriers are low); Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Bus.
Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1982) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence
other than market share to prove monopolization); Broadway Delivery Corp. v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 122, 127-30 (2d Cir.) (firm with low market
share may nevertheless possess monopoly power), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968
(1981). Some economists have developed statistical models for measuring market power directly. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker &Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods for Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANrnmUST
L.J. 3, 3-13 (1992) (discussing econometric techniques to measure market
power). But, until Kodak, the Court had clung steadfastly and exclusively to
the market share proxy.
45. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
46. Id. at 2086 ("As Kodak notes, there likely will be some large-volume,
sophisticated purchasers who will undertake the comparative studies and insist, in return for their patronage, that Kodak charge them competitive life cycle prices. Kodak contends that these knowledgeable customers will hold down
the package price for all other customers."). Although the Court doubts that
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Presumably, if sophistication can counteract one source of market power, it can counteract them all.4 7 Kodak thus suggests

that sophistication could influence every antitrust dispute.
In particular, the Court noted that, even in ostensibly competitive markets for complex, durable goods, "difficult and
costly" information gaps about a firm's life cycle prices can enhance a firm's market power, regardless of its market share. 48
The Court observed that many buyers cannot determine the life
cycle prices of complex, durable equipment 4 9 because the necessary information is hard to acquire, subject to change during the
product's life, and often customer-specific. 50 Furthermore, even
if buyers could overcome these barriers, they might choose not to
do so to avoid the difficulty and cost of acquiring the relevant
information. 5 1 Kodak argued that "sophisticated purchasers" in
its markets would overcome information gaps that could otherwise increase Kodak's market power. 52 These sophisticated purchasers would undertake the costly studies necessary to learn
life cycle prices and would successfully insist on competitive,
fixed, lifetime prices for parts and service. 5 3 By negotiating such
prices for themselves, Kodak claimed, these "knowledgeable"
buyers would indirectly secure them for all Kodak customers,
preventing Kodak from abusing any power that might otherwise
Kodak's contention will always be correct, revealed through its description of
circumstances when sophisticates will be unable to assist other customers, it
suggests by negative implication that Kodak's theory is sometimes correct.
47. Kodak could conceivably be read to stand for the proposition that two
types of market power exist-the "normal" kind based upon market share and
the special variant conferred by information gaps-and that sophistication can

diminish the latter type only. But, by creating different categories of market
power and subjecting those categories to different legal standards, that reading
would confuse antitrust doctrine even more than one that viewed sophistication
as affecting all forms of market power equally.
48. 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
49. Id. According to the Court, life cycle price is the total cost of owning
equipment over its useful life. Id. To ascertain the life cycle price of complex
equipment, buyers need "data on price, quality and availability of products
needed to operate, upgrade or enhance the initial equipment, as well as service
and repair costs, including estimates ofbreakdown frequency, nature of repairs,
price of service and parts, length of 'down time' and losses incurred from down
time." Id. In addition, buyers need information about the residual value. Id. at
2085 n.20.
50. Id. at 2086.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2086-87. Kodak's buyers included "federal, state, and local government agencies, banks, insurance companies, industrial enterprises, and
providers of specialized copy and microfilming services." Id. at 2077.
53. Id. at 2086.
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54
stem from consumer ignorance.
Although the Court recognized sophisticated buyers as
"knowledgeable" and "insistent" on receiving competitive prices
for themselves, 55 it doubted their ability to ensure that Kodak
would charge competitive prices to its unsophisticated buyers as
well.5 6 If unsophisticated buyers substantially outnumber sophisticates, the Court reasoned, a powerful seller could refuse to
deal with sophisticated firms and charge supra-competitive
prices to unsophisticated firms. 57 The Court added that even
when sophisticated consumers are relatively numerous, they
would be unable to protect the unsophisticated from monopoly
pricing if the seller could price-discriminate between the two
groups. 58 Because Kodak could allegedly discriminate in this
manner, 59 the Court concluded that Kodak's sophisticated buyers would not necessarily constrain it from using information
60
gaps to exploit unsophisticated buyers.
Although it rejected Kodak's argument, the Court accepted
the premise that sophistication deserves special antitrust consideration. Recognizing that "large-volume, sophisticated purchasers" exist in certain markets, 6 1 the Court acknowledged
62
their ability to obtain competitive prices from powerful sellers.
The Court also suggested that, when sophisticated buyers are
relatively numerous or when sellers cannot price-discriminate
between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers, sophisticates can force powerful sellers to offer competitive prices to all
buyers. 63 By identifying sophistication as a possible counter-

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2087. Kodak sold parts to customers who serviced their own
equipment but refused to sell parts to customers who hired third-party service
companies. Id. The Court reasoned that companies with their own service staff
were likely to be "high volume users, the same companies for whom it is most
likely to be economically worthwhile to acquire the complex information needed
for the comparative lifecycle pricing." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2086.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2086-87. In particular, the Court stated that "if a company is
able to price discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, the sophisticated will be unable to prevent the exploitation of the uninformed," id., a statement whose negative inference is that, when price
discrimination is not possible, sophisticated firms can protect unsophisticated
firms from dominant sellers.
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weight to market power, the Court thus affirmed the significance of sophistication and appreciably enlarged its scope.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINING SOPHISTICATION
Introducing corporate sophistication into antitrust law creates an obligation to specify its meaning. Defining sophistication, however, presents an intractable conceptual dilemma. If
sophistication constitutes an independent variable that can influence judicial measures of market power, it must differ from
already recognized measures of market power. Because pre-sophistication antitrust determined market power according to
factors such as firm size and market share, 64 a concept of sophistication indistinct from these factors would be redundant.
Drawing a clear line between sophistication and other sources of
market power, however, inevitably results in definitions of sophistication too amorphous for effective judicial administration.
A concept of sophistication divorced from considerations of
other sources of market power must embrace a specific conception of super-rationality. Two possibilities exist. Courts could
define sophisticated firms as those with consistently large profits. This approach is superficially sensible; if the pursuit of
profit-maximization defines rationality, then persistently high
profits must mark firms as super-rational.
Several problems render this definition inadequate. Because high profits may reflect corporate size or market share, 65
this approach fails to distinguish sophistication from traditional
measures of market power. In addition, large profits often reflect factors that do not indicate commercial know-how or success. 6 6 Finally, evaluating and comparing inter-firm and intermarket profitability levels is administratively cumbersome. For
such reasons, perhaps, although most recent courts have distin64. See supra notes 23, 44 (describing courts' reliance on market share as
proxy for market power). Other suggested measures of power included consistently high profits, wide price-cost margins, and the continuing ability to pricediscriminate. See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 34, J 507-516, at 330-46;
HovENKp, supra note 27, §§ 3.1-3.7, at 55-82.
65. Areeda and Turner write that "persistent excess returns are convincing
proof of durable, individually held market power for a firm that is the only producer of a physically distinguishable product, or that has produced a high and
relatively stable proportion of the output of that product." 2 AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 34, 508, at 331; see also 2 id.
508-512, at 331-37 (discussing
excess returns and market power).
66. Large profits could, for example, arise from the sale of capital assets,
reward the high risk of doing business in certain markets, or result from the
choice of accounting methodology.
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67
guished sophistication from other sources of market power,
none has defined sophistication by reference to corporate profits.
Courts instead have favored an approach that defines sophistication as tactical expertise or negotiating success. 68 This
approach also has intuitive appeal. Common experience teaches
that some firms are "smarter" than others and regularly negotiate "better" deals. So conceived, sophistication simply formalizes an everyday reality of commercial life.
Even putting aside the difficulty of defining "smarter" and
"better," however, the tactical approach to defining sophistication has problems. Tactical expertise and commercial success
are relative standards that do not always fairly indicate sophistication. Instead of defining "winners" as sophisticated, they
may define "losers" as naive. Sensible 69
rules of thumb do not

translate easily into cogent rules of law.

More importantly, tactical expertise and business success
cannot define sophistication because they are outward manifes67. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2086 ("As Kodak notes,

there likely will be some large-volume, sophisticated purchasers who will undertake the comparative studies and insist (on] . . . competitive lifecycle

prices."); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416
(S.D. Iowa 1991) (referring to "large, sophisticated and powerful buyers"); FTC
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), 1 69,239, at 64,852,
64,855 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1990) (describing buyers as "large, sophisticated customers"); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 674 (D.
Minn.1990) (stating that buyers possessed "substantial power" and were "generally very sophisticated"); cf. FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("A concentrated and knowledgeable buying side makes collusion by
sellers more difficult.").
Curiously, some courts have equated sophistication with size or power,
avoiding the definitional problem but effectively eliminating sophistication as
an independent construct. See, e.g., FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d
1206, 1213 n.13 (11th Cir. 1991) (equating buyer sophistication with "'concentration on the buying side") (citing Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d
1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987)); United States v.
United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1085 (D. Del. 1991) (referring to sophisticated buyers as "very large consumers").
68. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
69. Because even the classic formulations of economic common sense-"a
fool and his money are soon parted"-use imprecise language unsuited to legal
discourse (what is a "fool? how fast is "soon"?) and are subject to theoretical
criticism (in an inflationary economy, might it not be smart to spend one's
money quickly?), some scholars argue that legal doctrine derived entirely from
common sense creates more problems than it solves. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, An
Appreciative Comment on Coase'sThe Problem of Social Cost: A View from the
Left, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 919, 925 ("The common sense intuitions of the common
law.., are at best a crude reflection of political, economic or moral judgments.
Not only are these intuitions parasitic and derivative, but they are also impervious to intellectual exploration.").
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tations of something more basic and more difficult to define.
This something else seems roughly akin to high corporate intelligence, a personal, intangible quality that is not amenable to
easy definition. The judicial attempts to define sophistication in
terms of "hard" bargaining and "successful" negotiating have
tacitly acknowledged this problem but failed to resolve it. Indeed, instead of genuinely exploring the meaning of corporate
or outintelligence, the merger courts have looked to practices
70
comes seemingly unrelated to "true" sophistication.
In contrast, Kodak more directly attempts to define sophistication in terms of corporate intelligence.7 1 Its view, that sophisticated buyers are "knowledgeable" about hard-to-discover
price information, implies that courts can define sophistication
as the quality of being fully informed about commercially relevant matters. 7 2 This definition raises at least two conceptual
problems of its own: intelligent firms would sometimes choose
not to acquire relevant information, and the notion of commercially relevant information is itself unavoidably ambiguous.
Intelligent companies will not always inform themselves
fully about important market facts. Sometimes they will have
no choice but to remain uninformed. Market structure can pre70. Some courts have characterized as "sophisticated" such seemingly ordinary activities as paying close attention to prices and pursuing multiple competitive bids, but have failed to indicate why rational firms would not also
engage in those activities. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908
F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (observing that the receipt of multiple bids indicates sophistication); Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. at 674 (finding
that sophisticated milk buyers closely monitored milk prices).
71. A precise understanding of Kodak's approach is made difficult by,
among other things, its punctuation. The relevant portion of the opinion states
that "[als Kodak notes, there likely will be some large-volume sophisticated
purchasers who will undertake the comparative studies [of lifecycle pricing] and
insist, in return for their patronage, that Kodak charge them competitive lifecycle prices." Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2086. The absence of a comma
after the word "purchasers" might indicate that the Court defines sophisticated
firms as those that are (i)fully informed about life cycle prices and (ii) insistent
on receiving competitive prices. Alternatively, it might mean that the Court
has no view of what constitutes sophistication but simply believes that,
whatever it may be, sophistication triggers the acquisition of full information
and the subsequent insistence on competitive prices. This Article reads Kodak
to define sophistication as knowledgeability plus insistence; broader readings
would be more susceptible to the Article's critique.
72. The Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit has also described sophisticated buyers as "knowledgeable," but without specifying that terms meaning.
See FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Buyers of
industrial dry corn are.., large and sophisticated .... A concentrated and
knowledgeable buying side makes collusion by sellers more difficult.").
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elude the production of full information, 73 or relevant information can become available too late to be useful.7 4 Sometimes

intelligent firms will deliberately refrain from acquiring information because its acquisition costs exceed its anticipated value.
Indeed, in these circumstances companies bear witness to their
75
intelligence by not becoming fully informed.
In addition, because commercially relevant information can
come in many forms and from different sources, it will often be
unclear whether and how the presence of one fact might compensate for the absence of another. In Kodak, for example, the
Court thought that, because Kodak's competitors did not know
its life cycle prices, they could not help consumers make informed choices about whose product to buy.7 6 In Kodak's concededly competitive market,7 7 however, competitors presumably
would tell prospective buyers that Kodak's life cycle prices were
indeterminate and subject to post-purchase manipulation.
Although not the same as knowledge of Kodak's life cycle price,
73. The "public good" properties of information, and the relative ease with
which some firms can exploit information produced by others, often deter its
production. See PAUL A. SAmULSON & Wnimuw D. NoRDOHAus, ECONOmICS 4849, 713-15 (12th ed. 1985); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 632-38 (1979) (discussing the relevance of
imperfect information in the marketplace).
74. This was the case in Kodak, and would also be the case in other markets for complex durable goods. When products are long-lived and require periodic maintenance, determining at purchase their life cycle prices entails
estimating the frequency and intensity of future usage, future costs of parts and
services, and the likelihood that technological changes will make the products
obsolete. See supra note 49 (discussing life cycle prices). Buyers cannot confidently make these estimates at the time of purchase, because the information
necessary to their accuracy cannot be known until the future. Eastman Kodak
Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2086.
75. See GEORGE J. SrTxonR, The Economics of Information, in THE ORGAG ZATION or INDUSTRY, supra note 28, at 171; see also Richard A. Posner, Privacy,
Secrecy, and Reputation,28 BuFF. L. Ruv. 1, 13 (1979) ("The rational individual
or firm will terminate search [for additional information] at the point where the
marginal gain in knowledge from additional inquiry is just equal to the marginal cost.
").
76. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2086.
77. It was stipulated on appeal to the Ninth Circuit that the primary markets for equipment were competitive. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 616 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992);
see also 112 S. Ct. at 2081 n.10 (reiterating stipulation). Although a conspiracy
to restrict the flow of life cycle pricing information would clearly be unlawful,
see Harry S. Gerla, FederalAntitrust Law and the Flow of Consumer Information, 42 SYR. L. Ruv. 1029, 1029 (1991), no one alleged in Kodak that such a
conspiracy existed.
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this information arguably would serve a functionally equivalent
purpose.
Ultimately, although it expressly confronts the dilemma of
describing superior corporate intelligence, Kodak demonstrates
the serious problems of defining sophistication as corporate
knowledgeability. 78 The Kodak Court's failure to arrive at a satisfactory definition, like the failure of the merger courts, suggests that the new sophistication contains fatal conceptual
flaws. The inadequacy of existing definitions may, of course,
owe itself to circumstance. None of the recent cases involved a
dispute about the definition of sophistication, so no court needed
to delve into its precise meaning. Indeed, future courts may well
formulate definitions different from those that have thus far
emerged. This possibility, however, should not obscure the basic
problem. On the one hand, courts must distinguish sophistication from other sources of market power. On the Other hand, a
distinct concept of sophistication would be too amorphous for coherent definition.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOPHISTICATION
ANALYSIS
A.

DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES

The new sophistication substantively alters both merger
law and the broader inquiry into market power. Pre-sophistication merger courts had assumed that all powerful firms were potential entrants into contestable markets offering higher than
average returns on investment. 7 9 The sophisticated-buyer defense replaces this view with a narrower, fact-based approach
that regards potential entry as a function of sophistication as
well as traditional market power.8 0
The new approach requires merger defendants asserting a
post-merger entry defense to prove buyer sophistication. 8 ' It
78. Kodak's full definition of sophistication requires knowledgeability plus
insistence on receiving competitive prices. See supra note 71 (discussing the
definition of sophistication in Kodak). The insistence requirement is not only
imprecise, it ignores the likelihood that dominant sellers would offer competitive prices to powerful buyers without the buyers' insistence. See FTC v. Elders
Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Colluders are tempted to cheat
on their fellows when they can augment their profits by a single large sale (at a
shade below the cartel price) that is unlikely to be detected.").
79. See supra notes 21, 37 and accompanying text (discussing potential entry into contested markets).
80. See supra part H.A (discussing the sophisticated buyer defense).
81. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (discussing Kodak).
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also restricts the availability of the traditional post-merger entry defense by substantially reducing the population of potential
entrants.8 2 The changes wrought by the sophisticated-buyer defense thus increase the difficulty of defending merger
challenges.
Sophistication doctrine also significantly reshapes the market power inquiry. At its simplest level, Kodak suggests that
sophistication can both counteract and substitute for the market
power that high market share presumptively creates. 8 3 Because
high market share, as a proxy for market power, is a necessary
element of proof in successful claims of monopolization,8 4 attempted monopolization,8 5 unlawful tying arrangements, 86 and
group boycotts, 8 7 the market power inquiry pervades antitrust
litigation. Sophistication now forms an integral part of this

inquiry.
In addition, the suggestion that sophistication can negate
market power implies that it can generate such power as well.
Sophistication doctrine contemplates that whenever a firm can
obtain market power through a maximum of intelligence and a
minimum of wealth, sophisticates will obtain it. Small but
knowledgeable firms might become powerful, for example, by
virtue of first discovering the best source of high-quality, lowcost inputs and buying enough of such inputs to raise rivals'
82. Although courts could set the threshold of sophistication low enough to
include most firms in the population of potential merger entrants, recent cases
indicate that they will probably not do so. See supra note 70 (noting cases).
Indeed, such a low threshold would call into question the entire rationale of
sophistication doctrine.
83. See 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1992); see also supra notes 46, 61-63 (discussing the Court's perception of the relationship between sophistication and
market price).
Economists generally consider "market power" and "monopoly power" as
synonymous. See Richard Sctmalensee, Comment, Another Look at Market
Power,95 HARv. L. REV. 1789, 1789 n.1 (1982). The Supreme Court views market power as a necessary but not sufficient precondition to the possession of
unlawful monopoly power. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-13 (1984) (holding that the NCAA had market power
and thus carried the "heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense
which competitively justifies (an] apparent deviation from the operations of a
free market"); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (defining unlawful monopolization as the "wilfull acquisition or maintenance" of
market power).
84. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 113.
85. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993).
86. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984).
87. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986); Northwest
Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284' 298
(1985).
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costs.8 8 They might consistently outpace their rivals in devising
and adopting profitable organizational and contractual innovations. Taken to its logical extreme, sophistication doctrine could
thus reshape the notion of market power, uncoupling it from
market share and linking it instead to intelligence or knowledge.
The doctrinal changes associated with sophistication will
bring troubling consequences in their wake. The displacement
of the rationality assumption will require new fact-finding methodologies and new standards for scrutinizing commercial behavior. The complexity of this new process, its cost, and the
unpredictability of its outcomes will compromise the administration of antitrust litigation, deter enforcement, inhibit private ordering, and retard the law's movement toward efficiency.

B.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

Sophistication doctrine requires fact-intensive examinations into the sophistication of all firms in the relevant market.8 9 Keeping such examinations within manageable bounds
poses a substantial methodological problem. Coherent definitions of sophistication would ameliorate this problem, but, as
shown above, they are impossible to formulate.9 0 Even if one
accepts the definitions developed to date, however, it is readily
apparent that factual inquiries into sophistication would be virtually limitless.
If, as the merger courts suggest, tactical "expertise" and
bargaining "success" define sophistication, 9 ' then courts must
define these terms as well. This task would not be easy.9 2 Even
88. This is a sophistication-based variant of the raising rivals' cost thesis.
See Thomas G. Krattennaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230-82

(1986) (discussing several exclusionary practices used to raise rival's costs, and
the effectiveness of such practices).
89. Although courts have referred almost exclusively to sophisticated buyers, the rationale of sophistication doctrine is not buyer-specific. Sellers can
just as easily display tactical expertise, enjoy bargaining success, and acquire
full information. Moreover, because all firms buy in some markets and sell in
others, sophisticated buyers are likely to be sophisticated sellers as well. The
logic of sophistication thus embraces both sides of the market and by indicating
that, when enough firms are sophisticated, sophistication can affect market
power, Kodak arguably requires courts to examine all firms for sophistication.
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2086-

87 (1992).
90.

See supra part III (discussing difficulties).

91. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
92. Without belaboring the point, it can safely be said that "expertise" and
"success" can be viewed in either objective or relative terms. Under either view,
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if accomplished, it would introduce a long series of complex inquiries. Because isolated instances of expertise or success
should not define a firm as sophisticated, courts would have to
examine corporate histories for "adequate" evidence of these factors. This inquiry presupposes that courts have first decided
how much history, whose history, and which history to examine.9 3 Finally, to make sense of those histories, courts will
need a means of weighing successes against failures and of characterizing an entire course of conduct.
The Kodak informational approach to sophistication produces comparable difficulties. If sophistication consists of being
"fully informed" about commercially "relevant" matters, courts
must decide what these words mean.9 4 They must quantify and
measure market information, although the academic literature
prescribes no method for doing So. 9 5 Courts must also decide
how much of such information is relevant, how much relevant
information alleged sophisticates possess, and whether, accordof releing to an "acceptable" standard, 96 a corporation's store
97
vant information suffices to render it sophisticated.
defining the factors of interest, measuring them, and evaluating their import
comprise a substantial undertaking.
93. The choices are far from simple: five years of history, or ten; the history of current management only, or of past managements as well; the entire
negotiating history of the relevant period, or only the history of negotiations
properly characterized as "important."
94. Several possibilities exist. "Fully informed" firms could, for example,
possess (1) all conceivable information, (2) all information produced by the market, or (3) less information than (1) or (2) but "enough" to make "rational" decisions about "important" matters.
95. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer ProtectionIssues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 688 (1982) (questioning whether courts can determine how much information particular
markets should produce); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 73, at 660-62 (doubting
that courts can reasonably speculate about the informational content of a hypothetically perfectly informed market).
96. Determining an acceptable standard would require choosing between
an objective test and a relative one, and then choosing between different objective or relative tests. See supra note 92. Possible objective tests include: (a)
information actually in the market, and (b) information that would exist if the
market produced all relevant information. Relative tests, meanwhile, could ask
whether alleged sophisticates are well-informed compared to: (1) firms in their
market, or (2) firms in other markets as well.
97. The measurement problems are striking. If sophisticated firms are defined as those that possess all information regardless of cost, courts will have to
determine how much information hypothetical spendthrift firms could elicit. If
they are defined instead as firms that possess only information whose acquisition is cost-effective, courts will have to calculate the cost and value of all information available, as well as how much additional information could have been
produced cost-effectively.
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In addition to creating problems of measurement, sophistication doctrine raises the problem of calibrating judicial scrutiny to match the needs of various markets. The rationality
assumption led pre-sophistication courts to regard all markets
with equal scrutiny. Indeed, so powerful was this assumption
that courts refused to pay special attention even to highly imperfect markets, such as those for professional services. 98
By acknowledging inter-firm and inter-market differences
in rationality, the new sophistication requires differing levels of
judicial scrutiny. The logic of sophistication suggests, for example, that transactions between participants of "unequal" intelligence deserve closer examination and merit the application of
more rigid standards than those involving equals. Similarly,
markets displaying "significant" informational imperfections
also may warrant heightened scrutiny. Differing levels of scrutiny, in turn, necessitate methodologies for identifying the various levels, differentiating among them, and choosing the level
appropriate for each case.
C.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

The doctrinal and methodological changes produced by the
new sophistication will impede the effective adjudication of antitrust disputes. By displacing the rationality assumption with a
fact-specific approach, sophistication doctrine narrows the availability of summary judgment. The imprecision inherent in its
approach will prevent private firms from confidently ordering
their behavior. Its costs and uncertainty will stifle antitrust enforcement and retard efficient doctrinal change. Finally, its
98. Several Supreme Court opinions prior to 1975 left the impression that
the "learned professions" were exempt from antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g., FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (stating that "[miedical practitioners...
follow a profession and not a trade"). The Court dispelled that impression in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), declaring that "[t]he nature
of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman
Act." Id. at 787; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 349 (1982) (stating that "[i]n unequivocal terms... the Sherman Act, so
far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike") (internal quotations omitted); Barry R. Furrow,

The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From
Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. REv. 147, 172-90

(1989) (discussing the need for regulatory and judicial action to assist the free
flow of information in the healthcare industry); Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of

Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21

CoNN. L. REv. 605, 608-16 (1989) (showing that, despite valid quality-based justifications for restraint of trade in healthcare, the Supreme Court has unqualifiedly stated that antitrust scrutiny must focus on economic factors).
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methodological demands will overburden the fact-finding and interpretive capacities of existing institutional structures.
1. The Incompatibility of Sophistication and Summary
Judgment
Because "[a]ntitrust cases are notoriously extended,"9 9 the
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of administrative efficiency in antitrust law 0 0 and has promoted summary
judgment as a particularly effective means of achieving such efficiency. 01 ' Less than ten years ago, the Court described summary judgment "not as a disfavored procedural shortcut" but as
an "integral part of the Federal Rules... which are designed
'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action.' "102 Observers widely regarded this express recognition of the benefits of summary judgment as directly rejecting
the earlier view that it "should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation" 10 3 and, instead, encouraging the expanded use
99. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325,
1333 (7th Cir. 1986).
100. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,430
(1990) ("The administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling.").
101. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
598 (1986) (reinstating Matsushita's motion for summary judgment and remanding for further proceedings). Along with Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Matsushita was thought to presage an expanded and easier use of summary judgment. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There
Been a MaterialChange in Standards?,63 NoRE DAME L. REV. 770, 777 (1988)

("[Tihe net effect [of the summary judgment trilogy] should be the more widespread granting of summary judgment .... "); Marcy J. Levine, Comment, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes Complete Reversal in the 1986
Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L.J. 171, 209 (1988) ("he impact of the three...

cases ... is fairly clear. Courts will adopt a considerably more permissive posture toward the summary judgment motion...."). The Federal Judicial Center
recently concluded that those cases "did not produce a general increase in summary judgment activity in the district courts examined." Joe S. Cecil, Trends in
Summary Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings 16 (Apr. 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Federal Judicial Center and with author).
Some United States Courts of Appeals, however, have actively employed summary judgment in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d
1404, 1409 (9th Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 617 (1991).
102. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
103. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464,473 (1961); see
also Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment,Motions to Dismiss, and OtherExamples of EquilibratingTendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065,

1120 (1986) (quoting commentators critical of the use of summary judgment in
antitrust cases).
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of summary judgement. 10 4
Prior to the new sophistication, antitrust courts had permitted arguments founded primarily on economic theory to support
successful motions for summary judgment.1 0 5 Case-specific economic facts were relevant, but if facts conflicted with theory,
courts tended to discount their weight.1 0 6 Theoretical arguments depend heavily, however, on the vitality of the rationality
assumption, and any weakening of that assumption naturally
undermines their force.
For example, small- and mid-size firms could formerly argue
convincingly in support of summary judgment motions that they
lacked the market share prerequisite to power. Now, however,
such arguments may lack dispositive force. By enabling parties
to contend that low market share understates actual market
power, sophistication doctrine trumps the presumption that
small defendants can do no harm,1 0 7 requiring factual inquiries
104. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that Matsushita "approv[es] the use of summary judgment in
complex antitrust litigation"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[C]ontrary to the
emphasis of some prior precedent, the use of summary judgment is not only
permitted [by Matsushita]but encouraged... in antitrust cases."), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 852 (1988); Susan S. DeSanti & William E. Kovacic, Matsushita: Its
Constructionand Application by the Lower Courts, 59 ANTITRusT L.J. 609, 63253 (1991) (examining the implications of the summary judgment defense in antitrust cases); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 88-91 (1990) (discussing the expanded use of summary judgment in all types of cases).
105. Matsushitarepresents the high water mark of this approach. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ("[I]f the factual context renders [a] claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no [theoretical] economic sense-[a
party] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim
than would otherwise be necessary."); see also Lawrence T. Festa, III, Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the Chi-

cago Empire, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 619, 648 (1993) ("[Clommentators and
courts had viewed Matsushita as a colossus in the world of antitrust summary
judgment."); Lisa M. Judson, Note, Kodak v. Image Technical Services: The
Taming of Matsushita and the Chicago School, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1633, 1649

(discussing the use of economic theory in Matsushita).
106. In Matsushita,the Court expressly rejected empirical evidence about
the operation of the market, in favor of economic assumptions in conflict with
that evidence. 475 U.S. at 594 n.19 ([I]n our view the expert opinion evidence
of below-cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the [theoretical] factors, discussed in [the Opinion], that suggest that such conduct is
irrational.").
107. It can also underlie the argument that large size overstates actual
power. Taking their cue from the merger courts, large defendants can claim
that the sophistication of firms with which they deal rebuts the presumption of
power normally arising from large market share.
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into sophistication and its effects and making summary judgment impossible. 0 8s The fact-specific nature of sophistication
doctrine thus narrows the potential scope of summary judgment
and precludes antitrust from realizing the important efficiencies
of a more theoretical approach.' 0 9
Diminishing the availability of summary judgment will ultimately discourage antitrust enforcement. As courts discard simplifying assumptions about market behavior in favor of complex,
fact-specific investigations, the cost of trial and the unpredictability of its outcome will increase. Increased cost and complexity will inhibit agency inquiry" ° and deter potential private
plaintiffs from bringing suit."' Although some commentators
have advocated limiting antitrust enforcement, 112 none contends that the expense and uncertainty of trial should serve as
the means for doing so.
2. Private Ordering Concerns: Sophistication as a
Sub-Optimal Rule
The conception of a law-based political order places great
theoretical and practical importance on the value of private ordering. Political theory suggests that governmental intervention in private affairs should follow strictly from publicly
available, comprehensible rules and standards that can produce
108. Kodak pays lip service to the force of economic theory, acknowledging
that "[ilf the plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no reasonable jury
could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted." Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1992). But,
Kodak's concern with the market power obtainable from information gaps and,
more importantly, its suggestion that sophistication constitutes a form of market power, id. at 2081-87, effectively makes all theories sensible and requires
factual examinations in every case.
109. The impact of Kodak on summary judgment quickly generated substantial scholarly commentary. See Festa, supra note 105, at 662; William W.
Schwarzer & Alan Hirsch, Summary JudgmentAfter Eastman Kodak, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4-20 (1993); Judson, supra note 105, at 1633-73; The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REv. 163, 328, 335 (1992).
110. Budgetary limitations and the high cost of the factual inquiries that
sophistication doctrine requires will naturally constrain enforcement agencies
from investigating allegations of anticompetitive behavior, especially given the
expense of trial and increased uncertainty of a favorable outcome.
111. See infra note 130 (discussing factors plaintiffs consider in bringing
suit).
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2
(1984) ("If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may
be lost for good ....
If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice,
though, the welfare loss decreases over time.").
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concrete, predictable outcomes.' 1 3 Laws that are substantially
indeterminate undermine the legitimacy of government under
law. 1 14 Moreover, as a practical matter, indeterminate laws
may prevent citizens from predicting the legal consequences of
their behavior, frustrating personal and business autonomy and
burdening potentially beneficial activity with legal risk." 5
The indeterminable meaning of sophistication doctrine and
the unpredictability of its application will inhibit private ordering. Because clear and predictable legal rules are critical to private business, imprecise antitrust doctrine can prove especially
costly. Antitrust disputes usually involve large sums of money,
and rarely occur by accident. The firms whose transactions and
behaviors engender antitrust disputes plan such activities, often
years in advance, with the help of professional legal advice. The
projected legal consequences of proposed transactions bear heavily on their implementation. Predictable antitrust rules thus en16
joy substantial commercial value. 1
The importance of legal predictability for corporate decisionmaking in general and for encouraging capital investment in
particular suggests that antitrust doctrine should function like
"successful" administrative rules, affording regulated actors
clear behavioral guidelines that effectively promote the underlying principles of competition policy without incurring inefficient
administrative or private costs. 1 7 Indeed, antitrust courts and
113. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-7, 101-04 (1980) (arguing that courts should overrule majoritarian policies only when the political
system is flawed); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 81, 86-88 (1985)
(discussing the expectation of citizens that democracy will produce a tight connection between majoritarian institutions and legal decisions).
114. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 8186 (1977); Roberto M. Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 563, 564-65, 576-77 (1983).
115. See generally Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 999-1000 (1994)
(questioning whether indeterminate laws pose greater practical problems than
the theoretical problems critics generally address).
116. See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-FrillsCase for a
Per Se Rule Against Vertical PriceFixing, 71 GEo. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983) ("Per
se rules represent a recognition that.., there is a virtue in telling businessmen
accurately and precisely the location of legal limits on business conduct.").
117. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The OptimalPrecision ofAdministrativeRules,
93 YALE L.J. 65, 67 (1983) (discussing the elements of a successful administrative rule); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257-61 (1974) (discussing the relative efficiency of legal rules and standards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An
Economic Analysis, 42 DuRE L.J. 557, 557 n.1 (1992) (citing authorities).
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commentators have explicitly recognized the "close connection"
between antitrust law and other forms of administrative regulation of markets.1 1 8 This connection argues forcefully for antitrust doctrine sufficiently precise to satisfy the needs of business
for predictable behavioral guidelines.
Administrative law scholars claim that the success of a rule
depends upon the effect of its wording on its intended audience.1 19 Successful rules, they contend, share three character120
istics: "transparency," "accessibility," and "congruence."
"Transparent" rules have "[a] well-defined and universally accepted meaning within the relevant community."12 ' The terms
in "accessible" rules apply "to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or effort."' 22 "Congruent" rules are effective in
123
promoting underlying policy.
Sophistication doctrine displays none of the characteristics
of successful administrative rules. Its terminology is not transparent; rather, its inherently ambiguous, qualitative character
will prevent the business community from understanding it in
any well-defined fashion. Sophistication doctrine is inaccessible
because its application invariably will entail "excessive difficulty
or effort" in the form of prolonged, unstructured, and inconclusive inquiries. Finally, sophistication doctrine is not congruent
because its elusive meaning and the cost and uncertainty of its
application will hamper its effectiveness in promoting competi124
tion policy.
These failures will inhibit private ordering. Without the
118. See DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 463,566 (1989); Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the JurisdictionalFoundationof Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 657, 669 (1993); see also Barry Wright Corp. v.
ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[Antitrust] law is an
administrative system ....Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove
counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.").
119. Diver, supra note 117, at 67.
120. Id. at 66-67.
121. Id. at 67.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. By contrast, the "rules" derived from the rationality assumption contain none of these defects. They treat all firms alike, in terms easily understood, and promote effectively, if not perfectly, well-known policy goals. Presophistication merger law, for instance, permitted seller-side mergers adding
notably to concentration levels, provided buyers of the merger partners were
either sufficiently large or concentrated to dissipate post-merger seller dominance. The latter proviso constituted a power-based test whose terms were
comprehensible and which advanced consumer welfare concerns with a minimum of administrative cost.
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guidance that "successful" rules provide, private businesses will
be left to guess about the meaning of market power, and therefore about the legality of innovative arrangements and transactions. Sophistication doctrine informs them that size no longer
completely defines market power but neglects to tell them what
does. This uncertain message increases the risk of, and therefore will discourage, potentially beneficial behavior. By clouding
the meaning of antitrust law, the ambiguous rules of sophistication doctrine thus threaten to calm the "perennial gale of creative destruction,"125 the impetus to valuable risk-taking that
expands the economy and improves consumer welfare.
3.

Durable Inefficiencies of Sophistication

By discouraging public and private enforcement, the cost
and uncertainty of sophistication doctrine will retard any tendency of antitrust to achieve greater legal efficiency. Law and
economics scholars have hypothesized that "the common law is
best... explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of society."12 6 They theorize that, because inefficient legal rules impose higher transaction costs on parties subject to them,
disputes arising under such rules result in litigation more frequently than disputes arising under efficient rules. 127 More frequent litigation, they argue, improves the law's efficiency by
increasing the likelihood that courts will overturn or reformu128
late inefficient rules.
Because the financial stakes involved in antitrust are so
large, inefficient antitrust doctrine imposes unusually high
transaction costs. 12 9 Such costs, in conjunction with the profit
125. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83-84
(3d ed. 1950) (describing capitalism as a "perennial gale of creative
destruction").
126. POSNER, supra note 14, at 23. Extensive literature documents the development of this theory over the past 30 years. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960); Richard A. Posner, Killing or
Wounding to Protecta PropertyInterest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971); George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). Although it claims descriptive and normative efficiency
for the common law, efficiency theory does not argue that every common law
doctrine and decision is efficient. POSNER, supra note 14, at 23.
127. See Priest, supra note 126, at 68.
128. Id. at 73 ("To the extent that a statute or an interpretation of a statute
imposes inefficiencies, it will be more likely to be overturned because of the
greater likelihood of relitigation.").
129. "Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with high
stakes and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation
...

."

Easterbrook, supra note 112, at 12. Despite its statutory origins, anti-
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motive and the benefits of greater legal predictability, should
generally prompt antitrust disputants as a class to relitigate
inefficient rules until courts reformulate them into coherent and
predictable standards. By substantially raising the expense and
uncertainty of trial, however, sophistication doctrine erects barthe movement of anriers to frequent litigation that will impede
13 0
efficiency.
greater
toward
titrust law
For the common law to produce efficient rules, parties affected by inefficient rules must be willing and able to challenge
them frequently. Efficiency theory presumes as much, postulating parties that litigate ambiguous rules, enjoy unhindered access to court, and can afford the cost of trial. 13 1 The rules and
methodology of sophistication doctrine, however, will make an
already expensive trial process 1 32 prohibitively costly, reducing
the frequency of litigation and retarding the clarification of the
law. Its complexity could thus immunize the new sophistication
from regular challenge, preventing antitrust from becoming
more efficient and permitting inefficient standards to linger.

trust is widely regarded as a common law field. See, e.g., Rudolph J. Peritz, A
Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DU=n L.J. 263, 269 ('[Jiudges and
scholars have viewed the [Sherman Act] as little more than a congressional
mandate to develop a federal common law of competition.").
130. Formal studies of incentives inducing private parties to bring suit have
examined the divergence between social and private costs and benefits, respec-

tively, and the ways in which expanding or narrowing that divergence can affect the institution of suit. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, PrivateVersus Social Costs
in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL SUD. 371 (1986); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL
SUD. 333 (1982). For potential private plaintiffs, the incidence of suit appears
to be a function of anticipated private returns, discounted by the direct costs of
suit, uncertainty of success, and length of time between commencement of suit
and collection of judgment. The calculus for public plaintiffs would differ
slightly, adding anticipated social benefits and social costs. Because sophistication doctrine substantially increases all cost factors and affects benefits uncertainly, it would discourage both categories of potential plaintiffs from bringing
suit.
131. Priest, supra note 126, at 66-72.
132. See, e.g., JAmEs B. STEwART, THE PARTNEPs 53-113 (1983) (recounting
the litigation of, and expenses incurred in litigating, IBM's antitrust cases in
the 1970s and '80s). In describing the mammoth antitrust litigation between
the United States and IBM in the 1970s, Stewart noted that "the government
was asking for 5 billion additional documents ... (which] would cost IBM $1
billion to retrieve, review and produce." Id. at 102. Indeed, the public good
properties of litigation further increase the litigants' direct costs. See Richard
A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv.
1717, 1728 (1982).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[-Vqol. 79:1

4. Institutional Implications of Sophistication Doctrine
Twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court expressed serious doubts about the judiciary's ability to solve complicated questions of antitrust economics. "[C]ourts," it said,
"are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems
....
[They are] ill-equipped and ill-suited for such decisionmaking [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would
surely be brought to bear on such decisions." 13 3 The Chicago
school has since brought price theory to the forefront of antitrust
analysis.' 3 4 Its powerful assumptions have increased the availability of summary judgment and generally precluded the voluminous inquiries whose prospect troubled the Court.
By demanding elaborate inquiries, the new sophistication
challenges the judiciary's capacity to resolve antitrust cases.
Antitrust judges traditionally have not assessed market-wide
levels of corporate sophistication or measured "difficult and
costly" information gaps. Nor have they received academic
training in the theoretical economics arguably bearing on these
matters. 13 5 Consequently, concerns of judicial economy, comparative advantage, and accuracy in factfinding indicate that
the judiciary may not be the best institution for unravelling the
complexities of sophistication doctrine.
The inadequacy of the courts to face the new antitrust jurisprudence naturally suggests that administrative agencies might
133. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609, 611-12 (1972) (footnote omitted).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 222-230 (discussing the Chicago
school).
135. The complexities of sophistication doctrine will be even harder for juries to resolve. Indeed, the issues of jury ability to understand antitrust economics and the propriety of continuing jury involvement in antitrust litigation
have been subjects of continuing academic debate. See, e.g., James M. Campbell, The Current Understandingof the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trials in
Modern Complex Litigation,66 WASH. U. L.Q. 63, 63-70 (1988) (arguing that a
federal court may strike a plaintiff's jury demand in complex litigation);
Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CAL. L. Rav. 1, 67-77 (1981) (arguing that judges may bifurcate antitrust trials and decide market structure issues, while juries decide questions of
conduct and damages); Frank M. Loo, A Rationalefor an Exception to the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: In Re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation, 30 Civ. ST. L. Rv. 647, 657-72 (1981) (examining circumstances under which exceptions to the 7th Amendment jury trial right are
permissible); Charles B. Renfrew, The Propriety of a Jury in the Complex Antitrust Action, 49 ANTrrRuST L.J. 1023, 1023-27 (1980) (discussing practical and
legal issues involved in trying antitrust cases before juries).
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be better suited institutionally to resolve these complexities.
Relative expertise and more flexible techniques of informationgathering could enable them to conduct and understand the industry-wide surveys that sophistication requires. 13 6 Moreover,
while judicially-imposed remedies cover defendants only,1 37 administrative rule-making can embrace entire markets, affording
agencies the latitude necessary to correct structural imperfec138
tions beyond the reach of courts.
Significant drawbacks, however, compromise the advantages of the administrative model. Administrative rule-making
demands a level of generality too broad for the firm-specific requirements of sophistication doctrine. 13 9 The variability of markets would require so many exceptions to rules governing
sophisticated firms that any benefits of the administrative
model would be lost. 140 In addition, the wide scope of the rulemaking process would permit agency interference in private
markets on a scale unimaginable under the adjudicative model,
upsetting the balance between government intervention and
market freedom that antitrust policy has struggled to
achieve.14'
136. The Supreme Court itself has praised "the empiric process of administration," and its ability to accomplish "validation by experience." Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); see also Samuel Estreicher, Policy
Oscillationat the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. Rav. 163,
171-75 (1985) (discussing the procedural advantages of administrative rule-

making).

137. See generally AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 32, T

137-152, at 62-104

(discussing criminal punishments, equitable remedies, and private actions directed at particular defendants).
138. Substantive administrative rule-making has been likened to legislation
in its breadth and flexibility. See, e.g., RcHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMumSTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.4 (2d ed. 1992) ("Rulemaking is analogous to
legislating."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADmiNsTRATwva LAw 238-44 (3d ed. 1988)
(discussing administrative agencies' promulgation of rules that have the effect
of substantive law).
139. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., AdministrativeEquity: An Analysis to Excep-

tions to Administrative Rules, 1982 Duim L.J. 277, 289 ("Agencies face the dilemma of devising rules specific enough to be meaningful, yet general enough to
fit a variety of situations. The broader the regulatory task, the greater the likelihood that unforeseen situations will arise .... ."). See generallyRoscoe Pound,
Discretion,Dispensationand Mitigation: The Problemof the IndividualSpecial

Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 925 (1960) (discussing the need to individualize the
administration of justice).
140. See Colin S. Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin AdministrativeLaw, 95
393, 418-20 (1981) (discussing efforts to resolve policy issues

HARv. L. REV.

through the adoption of more definite, specific administrative regulations and
regulatory statutes).
141. Federal antitrust law has witnessed ongoing debate between advocates
of relatively frequent government intervention in private markets and those
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Ultimately, the dictates of sophistication doctrine will exceed the fact-finding capabilities of both institutional models.
Neither courts nor administrative agencies will be able to cope
successfully or efficiently with the doctrine's definitional and
methodological demands. This is not to suggest that different
models might not cope more effectively with these demands. It
is to suggest, however, that sophistication stretches current
models to their institutional breaking points.
V. THE QUESTIONABLE RATIONALE OF
SOPHISTICATION
In the past few years, antitrust has traded the clear and
simple assumption of uniform rationality for the uncertain vocabulary and complicated methods of sophistication. In the process, it has obscured antitrust doctrine, opened the litigation
process to extensive and futile factual inquiries, subverted the
role of summary judgment, and increased the costs of antitrust
administration without improving its efficiency. Inexplicably,
no court has acknowledged these changes, offered a rationale for
sophistication doctrine, or provided a theoretical basis for its
adoption.
Perhaps courts have thought it unnecessary to explain sophistication because of its close correspondence with two other
developments that have recently captivated them. On the one
hand, the notion of sophistication, at first glance, fits comfortably into the post-Chicago school of antitrust analysis. On the
other hand, it resembles in microcosm the larger movement of
antitrust toward a jurisprudence of hyper-complexity. Although
these developments may account for sophistication's easy passage into doctrine, they do not justify it. Rather, the problems
inherent in these new developments only serve to underscore
the theoretical and practical dilemmas of sophistication doctrine
and to highlight the disturbing direction of modem antitrust.
contending that, because markets are largely self-correcting, intervention is almost always unnecessary, wasteful, or both. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1714, 1719 (1986) (contrasting the
Chicago view that "business virtually always acts in society's interests" with its
critics' view that "government intervention can do good"); Frederick M. Rowe,
The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusion of Models: The FaustianPact of Law
and Economics, 72 GEo. L.J. 1511, 1513 (1984) (arguing that normative economic models, on which antitrust law is based, polarized antitrust into extremes of intervention and abstention).
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SOPHISTICATION AS A MISUNDERSTANDING OF STRATEGIC
VIRTUE

Perhaps the new sophistication is best understood as a judicial misapplication of strategic analysis. Analysis of strategic,
or opportunistic, behavior has taken hold in many areas of the
law. Legal scholars have applied principles of strategic behav14 2
ior, and the related discipline of game theory, to bankruptcy,
43
corporate law,' contracts,'" private decisions to settle or litigate, 4 ' plea bargaining, 14 6 property law,14 7 and torts.148 In the
past ten years, antitrust economists of the post-Chicago
school, 14 9 applying insights from game theory, 5 0 have postu142. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
BargainingModel of CorporateReorganizations,20 J. LEGAL STuD. 311 (1991)
(using noncooperative bargaining theory models to reexamine bankruptcy
rules); David G. Carlson, Game Theory and Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 9
B -ca. DEv. J. 219 (1992) (examining bankruptcy priority rules through game
theory).
143. See Symposium, Just Winners and Losers: The Application of Game
Theory to CorporateLaw and Practice,60 U. Cnq. L. REv. 405 (1991) (collecting
various articles).
144. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, StrategicContractualInefficiency and
the Optimal Choice ofLegal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 732-34 (1992) (discussing
strategic reluctance of parties to enter into maximized contingent contracts);
Jason S. Johnston, StrategicBargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (using contemporary game theory and
strategic behavior to analyze courts finding implied terms in contracts); Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the
Law of ContractFormation,89 MICH. L. Rlv. 215 (1990) (evaluating the law of
contract formation under the rules of game theory).
145. See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Informationand the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 187-205 (1993) (showing that strategic behavior, through asymmetric information advantages, affects decisions to
litigate or settle disputes).
146. See Jennifer F. Reinganum, PleaBargainingand ProsecutorialDiscretion, 78 AM. EcoN. Ray. 713 (1988).
147. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 48-53
(1990) (using game theory to argue that classic property theory fails to account
for other preferences of interested parties).
148. See Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer,17 J. LEGAL STuD. 15, 15-16, 25-41 (1988) (examining the role of strategic behavior in tort scenarios).
149. This term apparently originated in Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. RIv. 213 (1985), which characterized post-Chicago economics as "both more complex and more ambiguous than the Chicago
School model." Id. at 225.
150. For an excellent guide to the development, practice, and vocabulary of
game theory, see ERIc RAsMUsEN, GAMEs AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION
To GAME THEORY (1989); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in
Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANmusT L.J. 645, 646-55
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lated that strategic behavior can enable firms to achieve market
dominance. 15 1 To behave strategically, firms need not be large,
but they must understand and152seize opportunities for gaining
power at their rivals' expense.
As its name implies, post-Chicago scholarship follows and
responds to the Chicago school of antitrust analysis. 15 3 In the
1950s and '60s, the Harvard school of industrial organization,
5
with its focus on detailed case studies of particular industries,'1
claimed the attention of most antitrust courts and economists.
In the 1970s and '80s, however, the price-theoretical model of
the Chicago school supplanted Harvard's empirical approach.
Chicagoans contended specifically that price theory explained
diverse markets better than industry case studies that, although
& n.8 (1989) (discussing developments in economic theory that challenge the
Chicago school's conclusions on antitrust, and noting that most challenges "reflect insights gained through the application of game theory").
151. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers that Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147
(1988) (arguing that vertical restraints in health care may create market dominance by raising competitors' costs without creating concomitant offsetting efficiencies); Thomas J. Campbell, Predationand Competition in Antitrust: The
Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1625 (1987) (showing that an
established firm may use predatory pricing to force an equally efficient entrant
out of the market); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 88, at 209 (arguing that
firms can achieve monopoly power by making cost advantageous arrangements
with suppliers); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffinan, Cost-RaisingStrategies,
36 J. INDus. ECON. 19 (1987) (establishing that cost-raising strategies may disadvantageously affect rival firms in a market); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977) (arguing
that strategic behavior by dominant firms may overwhelm competitors' predation efforts). See generally Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Strategic
Business Behaviorand Antitrust, in ECONOMICS AN ANTrrRusT POLICY 39 (Robert J. Lamer & James W. Meehan, Jr., eds., 1989) (analyzing strategic behavior
in competitive markets, including predatory pricing, credibility, strategic
precommitment, entry deterrence, and collusion).
152. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 88, at 223-27.
153. An extensive literature describes the work of the Chicago school. See,
e.g., ROBERT BoRx, THE ANTrIRusT PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WrT ITSELF
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The ChicagoSchool of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 925 (1979). An equally extensive literature criticizes it. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Politicsof Law and Economics in JudicialDecisionMaking, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 554 (1986); Eleanor M. Fox & Robert Pitofsky, The Antitrust
Alternative, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 931 (1987); Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979); Gordon Spivack, The Chicago
School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A Response, 52
ANerRusT 651 (1983).
154. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDusTRIAL ORGANIZATioN (1959); JAMES McKIE,
TIN CANS AND TIN PiATE: A STUDY OF COMPETITION IN Two RELATED METHODS
(1959).

1994] THE NEW SOPHISTICATION IN ANTITRUST

37

rich in factual detail, were poorly founded in economic theory.' 5 5
The post-Chicago school builds on the industrial organization approach.' 56 Arguing that the broad generalizations of
price theory are inappropriate when small numbers of firms act
strategically, 5 7 post-Chicago scholars have applied insights
from game theory to develop models of strategic behavior
describing how small and moderate-sized firms can use market
imperfections to disadvantage competitors.' 5 8 Game theory conceives of business decision-making as a series of strategic
choices about the outcomes and payoffs available from various
courses of action. i 59 It concerns itself expressly with proposing
and weighing alternative strategies, and with deriving the best
set of tactics for the actors, or firms, participating in the
game.'

60

Post-Chicagoans have described several ways in which
firms can put such strategic behavior to anti-competitive use.
Some have suggested that firms in competitive markets can attain monopoly power by foreclosing rivals from lower cost inputs; this practice raises rivals' costs and forces them either to
quit the market or to increase prices to levels at which the strategic firms can earn supra-competitive profits.' 6 ' Others have
proposed that predatory pricing, which some judges and academicians consider implausible, 6 2 can succeed in certain markets
if the predator implements the proper strategy.'16 3 Still others
155. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8
(1976).
156. See generallyTimothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, The EmpiricalRenaissance in IndustrialEconomics: An Overview, 35 J. INDus. EcoN.
371 (1987) (maintaining that post-Chicago focuses on empirical testing of specific hypotheses and formal theories in industrial organizations, rather than a
case study methodology).
157. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games With the Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1291,
1316-17 (1990).
158. See Baker, supra note 150, at 649-50.
159. See RASMUSEN, supra note 150, at 22-25; see also Ayres, supra note 157,

at 1295 (discussing

RASusEN).

160. See Ayres, supra note 157, at 1297; RASMUsEN, supra note 150, at 27;
see also Carl Shapiro, The Theory of Business Strategy, 20 RAND. J. EcON. 125
(1989) (studying the effects of the exact specification and timing of the firm's
actions on game theory and business strategy generally).
161. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 88, at 213-14; Oliver E. Williamson, DelimitingAntitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (1987).
162. See BoRic, supra note 153, at 144-60; Frank Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 268 (1981); John S.
McGee, PredatoryPricingRevisited, 23 J.L. & EoN. 289, 296-300 (1980).
163. Campbell, supra note 151, at 1648 ("[In markets for non-fungible goods,
an] incumbent firm can... erode the customer base of an equally efficient en-
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have hypothesized that strategic behavior can take the form of
advertising, investment, product selection, or other activities
that raise the cost of doing business or deter entry. 164 In general, post-Chicagoans emphasize the capacity of market imperfections 16 5 to create market power, even for firms with small
market shares.
Judicial application of post-Chicago theory, however, is no
simple matter. Unlike the theoreticians who develop game-theoretic models, antitrust courts cannot assume that markets
under review contain structural imperfections. Judges require
evidence of these imperfections, of their adaptability to anticompetitive uses, and of a relationship linking them first to defendant's strategy and then to plaintiff's harm. Post-Chicago
theory thus contemplates rigorous empirical analysis, a methodology that post-Chicagoans justify as productive of more accuto the perceived laissezrate results and as a necessary antidote
166
faire bias of the Chicago school.
Post-Chicago is not without its critics. Chicago scholars
doubt the judiciary's ability to use complicated strategic models 167 and to analyze their antitrust implications. 168 Others
have suggested that the factual issues post-Chicago theory
raises "are too complex to be dealt with in antitrust litigation."16 9 Still others contend that courts should regard strategytrant without suffering an equivalent loss itself. The strategy involves moving
towards an entrant, either geographically or by mimicking the [product] characteristics of an entrant."); see also Janusz AL Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An
Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YAT.2
L.J. 8, 15-21 (1981) (discussing strategies).
164. See Holt & Scheffman, supra note 151, at 47.
165. Among other things, market imperfections include precommitment,
network externalities, installed base, sunk costs, and information and switching costs. See Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak Interview with Professor
Steven C. Salop, 7 ANrrrRusT 20, 20 (1992).
166. Some post-Chicago scholars see their models as consistent with the efficiency paradigm of Chicago theory. See Baker, supra note 151, at 646 ("W]e
need not reject the value of economic efficiency in order to question the Chicago
School."). Others regard the post-Chicago approach as more skeptical about
business behavior than Chicago and more open to governmental intervention.
See Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak Interview With Professor Steven C.
Salop, supra note 165, at 20 ("Post-Chicago analysis does not unskeptically attribute efficiency properties to conduct and... is more open to the possibility of
anticompetitive effects... [and] to intervention by policy makers.").
167. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MIcH. L. Rv.
1696, 1701, 1709-12 (1986) (also opposing as too costly and unpredictable the
case-by-case examination of allegedly strategic practices).
168. Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76
Gso. L. REv. 305, 314-16 (1987).
169. Hovenkamp, supra note 149, at 261. Professor Hovenkamp contended,
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based arguments warily because strategy of some sort underlies
all business behavior but seems to fail as often as it succeeds.
competitive effects of busiTherefore, these critics argue, "the
170
ness strategies are ambiguous."
The new sophistication doctrine arguably results from judicial misunderstanding of the import of strategic analysis. On its
face, sophistication seems ideologically compatible with the
post-Chicagoans' game-theoretic models of strategic behavior.
Strategy, after all, sounds like an activity reserved for the
smarter-than-average. Sophisticates, by any definition, are
super-rational firms. Without paying strict attention to the
premises of game theory, courts could therefore assume that effective strategies are the exclusive province of the sophisticated.
Despite its appeal, however, this assumption would be wrong.
Super-rationality has nothing to do with game theoretic models
of strategic behavior.
No post-Chicago model of strategic conduct predicates the
adoption of successful strategy on the actor's sophistication or
super-rationality. In discussing strategies for raising rivals'
costs, for example, Professors Krattenmaker and Salop make no
mention of sophisticated or super-rational firms, nor do they imply 17
that only such firms can formulate anticompetitive tactics. 1 Similarly, Professor Campbell's model of strategic, nonprice predation expressly presumes that all strategic firms behave equally rationally.' 7 2 In the same vein, Professor
conduct assumes a "dominant"
Hovenkamp's model of7strategic
3
firm acting rationally.'
Rather than create models that distinguish firms according
to their varying levels of rationality, game theory, as applied to
antitrust, has preferred to distinguish firms on the basis of
knowledge. For example, in the 1970s, some game theorists expanded their models to focus on individuals acting "rationally
but with limited information." 174 These models explicitly ashowever, that because courts had not been asked (as of 1985) to consider issues
of strategic behavior there was "no consensus among the courts that strategic
behavior should be ignored." Id.
170. Holt & Scheffman, supra note 151, at 66.
171. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 88, at 230-49.
172. See Campbell, supra note 151, at 1642 n.73.
173. Hovenkamp, supra note 149, at 266, 276-79 ('The two forms of strategic behavior have to do with the relationship between the credibility of threats
and the sunk costs of either the dominant firm or the victim, and the strategy of
raising rivals' costs.").
174. RASMUSEN, supra note 150, at 14; see also David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma, 27 J. EcoN.
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sumed that knowledgeable, rational players could distinguish
correctly between credible and implausible threats 175 while
equally rational but less knowledgeable players 176 could revise
their strategies to consider the prior behavior of more knowledgeable ones.' 7 7 Like the post-Chicago scholars mentioned
above, these game theorists premised their models on the assumption that all firms are equally rational.
Courts postulating that hyper-rational, sophisticated firms
have a corner on strategy miss the real point of strategic analysis. Strategic analysis does not seek to determine which firms
are sophisticated and which are not. Rather, it attempts to theorize usefully about how all firms use strategy to their benefit.
Courts that single out sophisticated firms for special antitrust
attention are thus embarking on uncharted theoretical waters.
At best, the link between sophistication and strategic behavior
is tenuous; at worst, it is non-existent.
Kodak attempts to connect post-Chicago theory and corporate sophistication by defining sophistication in terms of corporate knowledgeability.' 7 8 Its focus on information gaps reflects
about market imperfections as a source of
post-Chicago thinking
79
market power.1
If Kodak exemplifies post-Chicago analysis, however, it
demonstrates the unbridgeable distance between post-Chicago
theory and viable rules of antitrust. It is one thing for a theorist
first to assume, for argument's sake, that Buyer A lacks "sufficient" information about Seller B's product, and then to postulate models of strategic conduct illustrating how B can harm A.
It is quite another, however, for a court to require proof of what
constitutes information, which information is relevant, how
THEORY 245 (1982) (studying asymmetrical information's capability to generate

cooperative behavior in the prisoner's dilemma); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. EcoN. THEORY 253 (1982)
(showing how imperfect information about an independent market can affect
the rational strategies in another market).
175. See RASMUSEN, supra note 150, at 40, 88; Ayres, supra note 157, at
1306.
176. Although particular game-theoretic models assume that some players
are less knowledgeable than others, those models provide no methodology for
identifying knowledgeable players or measuring their specific stores of
information.
177. See RASMUSEN, supra note 150, at 58; Ayres, supra note 157, at 1307.
178. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text (discussing Kodak).
179. See Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak: Interview with Professor
Steven C. Salop, supra note 165, at 21. According to Professor Salop, who
served as a consultant to plaintiffs in Kodak, "[t]he [Kodak] Court's analysis of
the plaintiffs' claims is post-Chicago." Id.
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much information is "enough," whether and under what circumstances buyers without "enough" can effectively imitate more informed buyers, and when competing sellers can supply related
information that can compensate for missing facts about a given
seller's product. In practice, the neatness of the theory is undone by the factual inquiries that it demands.
As embodied in Kodak, the post-Chicago approach requires
factual measurements and evaluations that courts have never
before made and for which they lack competence. These measurements will not necessarily lead to more accurate judicial understanding of market dynamics, but they will certainly raise
the administrative costs of litigation and make its outcome less
predictable. In this sense, the post-Chicago approach is ultimately ironic. In seeking to incorporate consideration of market
failures into antitrust analysis, it creates a market failure of its
own. Information gaps about the legal import of Kodak's definitional tests will contribute to greater uncertainty among prospective plaintiffs about the likely results of litigation and
increase the costs of investigation and trial. These effects will
erect new entry barriers for would-be enforcers. By demonstrating the difficulty of applying post-Chicago theory to the complex
facts of real markets, Kodak thus confirms the doubts of postChicago's early critics 8 0 and illustrates academic economists'
ability to devise hypotheses of anticompetitive behavior whose
proof requirements outstrip the fact-finding capacity of judges
and juries.

B.

SOPHISTICATION AND THE TREND TowARDs HYPER-

COUIPrY
The new sophistication is part of an unparalleled increase
in the factual complexity of antitrust inquiry. In three recent
opinions, FTC v. Ticor Insurance Co. ,' s ' Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,'8 2 and Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,1s3 the United States Supreme
Court has announced rules that depend heavily on ambiguous,
fact-intensive inquiries. Although these rules apparently seek
greater factual precision, their definitional ambiguity is self-defeating and their single-minded focus on market arcana will ulti180. See supra text accompanying notes 167-170 (discussing critics).
181.

112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).

182.
183.

113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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mately mystify antitrust by removing more of its simplifying
assumptions.
1.

Ticor, Brooke Group, and Kodak

In FTC v. Ticor Ttle Insurance Co.,' 8 4 the Supreme Court
re-examined the state-action doctrine the Court established fifty
years ago in Parker v. Brown.'5 5 Prior to Ticor, defendants
seeking Parker immunity needed to satisfy a two-part test.
They had to prove that they had undertaken their allegedly anticompetitive behavior pursuant to a program "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,"18 6 and they
needed to show that the state itself had "actively supervised"
8 s7
this behavior'
Under Parker,proof of "active supervision" required a simple showing of actual state involvement in the administration or
oversight of the challenged program.' 8 8 Ticor departs from
Parkerby demanding evidence that "the State has played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the economic policy."' 8 9 Under Ticor, "active supervision" exists not simply by
virtue of state administration or oversight, but only if the state
"has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control"
over the program's operation.' 9 0
By turning the focus ofjudicial inquiry to the "sufficiency" of
state oversight, Ticor complicates the active supervision test. It
does not guarantee, however, a more probing examination.
Ticor can only encourage meaningful state oversight if "active"
supervision equals supervision of "high quality." Courts reading
Ticor to require such oversight will need to specify the elements
of high-quality supervision, apply these elements to varying and
lengthy historical records, and ultimately characterize the over184. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
185. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker,the Court held that the Sherman Act
neither prevents nor prohibits "state action or official action directed by a
state." Id. at 351. Decisions since Parkerhave extended state action immunity
to private actors participating in state-authorized programs allegedly restraining trade, provided that those programs clearly articulate an explicit
state policy to restrict competition and that the state itself actively supervises
the policy. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (chronicling the
development of the state action doctrine).
186. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189.

Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2177.

190. Id.
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all quality of oversight as "good" or "bad." Under any meaningful reading of Ticor, the process for determining active
supervision will become more complicated and costly without becoming more effective.
The Supreme Court's decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.191 rewrites the rules proscribing predatory pricing' 9 2 and primary-line price discrimination. 19 3 Because scholars had strongly criticized the Court's
prior stance on price discrimination, 194 Brooke Group was much
anticipated. On the positive side, by combining inconsistent approaches to predatory pricing' 95 into one comprehensive test,
Brooke Group promotes doctrinal efficiency. On the negative
side, however, Brooke Group partially resurrects a hopelessly
subjective inquiry into corporate intent that the Court had only
recently discarded.' 9 6 The revival of subjective intent analysis
will greatly dilute Brooke Group's gains in efficiency.
Brooke Group involved a claim by one cigarette manufacturer that a competitor sought to drive it from the generic market by offering discriminatory price discounts and selling its own
191.

113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).

192. Predatory pricing occurs when a firm prices below cost in order to drive
a rival from the market or to discipline the rival for having competed vigorously. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Supply Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,585 (1986).
Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree on the appropriate test for determining
whether price is below cost. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117 n.12. Brooke Group
did not resolve this disagreement. See 113 S. Ct. at 2587 n.1.
193. Price discrimination is made unlawful by § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly
that a "price discrimination" within the meaning of the statute "is merely a
price difference." See Texaco Inc. v Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558 (1990).
Claims of primary-line price discrimination allege injury to direct competitors
of the discriminating seller. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685, 702-04 (1967); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 538 (1960).
194. Prior to Brooke Group, Utah Pie had provided the standard for testing
claims of primary line injury in the predatory pricing context. 386 U.S. at 70204. Because it arguably stood for the proposition that selected pricing cuts in
healthy, competitive markets can violate the law, Utah Pie was roundly criticized. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court:
The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 70-85 (1967) (denouncing the result in
Utah Pie and stating, "Utah Pie must rank as the most anticompetitive antitrust decision of the decade"); Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah
Pie and the Consequences of Robinson-Patman,21 J.L. & ECON. 427,427 (1978)
("[The decision] has provoked much criticism on the grounds that it serves to
protect localized firms from the competition of more distant sellers.").
195. Compare Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. at 702-04 (describing early approach)
with Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 121 (describing structural test for predatory
pricing).
196. See infra note 205 (citing cases).
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To test these claims, the

Supreme Court established a two-part formula for unlawful
pricing.19 8 Plaintiffs must prove that "the prices complained of
are below an appropriate measure of [their] rival's costs" 199 and
that the predator had a reasonable prospect "of recouping its investment in below-cost prices." 20 0 Proof of prospective recoupment requires a showing that the intended target will likely
succumb to the predatory conduct. 2 0 ' This showing must
demonstrate "the extent and duration of the alleged predation,
the relative financial strength of the predator and its intended
°
victim, and their respective incentives and will."2 2
The numerous requirements of Brooke Group will each add
20 3
to the length and complexity of predatory pricing analysis.
None, however, will add more difficulty than the requirement of
proof regarding the parties' "respective incentives and will."204
By demanding such proof, Brooke Group modifies the Court's
own recently articulated view that predation analysis should ignore intent and focus exclusively on structural factors. 20 5 It also
20 6
conflicts with the similar views of several Courts of Appeals,
197. The plaintiff in Brooke Group (formerly Liggett) charged that Brown &
Williamson sought to stifle price competition in the emerging generic segment
of the national cigarette market by introducing its own line of generic cigarettes
and selling them to wholesalers at discriminatorily low prices. Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (1993).
198. In Brooke Group, the Court acknowledged that the same test governs
predatory pricing claims under the Sherman Act and price-discrimination
claims under the Robinson-Patman Act. 113 S. Ct. at 2587.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2588.
201. Id. at 2589.
202. Id.
203. For example, the term "likelihood" (as in "likelihood of recoupment") is
subject to several different interpretations. See Stephen Calkins, The October
1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity Than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 399 (1994) (offering three different conceptions of
"recoupment).
204. Brooke Group Ltd., 113 S. Ct. at 2589.
205. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 (1986).
206. Until the early 1980s, intent was a key factor in predation analysis.
See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967). Since
then, mounting skepticism about the judiciary's ability to distinguish anticompetitive animus from lawful rivalrous vigor has led many courts and commentators to conclude that intent should play no role whatever in predation claims.
See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); AA
Poultry Farms, Inc., v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-03 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu
Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. West-
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and with the consensus of scholarly opinion. 20 7 Brooke Group's
focus on recoupment follows the form of structural analysis, but
its insistence on inquiries into "incentives and will" compromises this analysis and sacrifices the efficiencies attainable
from an exclusively structural approach.
In practice, Brooke Group's subjective inquiries likely will
prove inconclusive. They will elicit testimony that promises to
display a scripted quality that could discredit the fact-finding
process. Asked about their incentives and will, plaintiffs likely
will testify that they were too dispirited to withstand defendants' predation. Defendants will swear to their own purely commercial motivation. The parties' experts will offer conflicting
views about the relationship between past behavior and probable intent. Like Ticor, Brooke Group rejects a simpler, more
facnumerous
determinate rule for an uncertain test requiring 20
8
tual inquiries into intangible corporate qualities.
Kodak best illustrates the pitfalls of the new jurisprudence.
The Court's holding-"difficult and costly information gaps7 in
markets for "complex durable goods" can confer market power
on small firms2 09-adds several tests to antitrust litigation. Its
specific concern with markets for "complex durable goods," for
example, makes Kodak the first modern antitrust opinion to distinguish analytically between different kinds of markets. 2 10 Its
em Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934
(1987); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir.
1983); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, 714.2(c) (discussing the
elusive nature of intent in the marketplace).
207. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, PredatoryPricingRequires 60% Market
Share: No "Oligopoly"Recoupment Without FirmMarket Power (VI), 23 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 73, 84, 90 (1991) (indicating unanimous agreement
among economists that predator needs market share between 40% and 60%, in
order to succeed); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing PredatoryPricingPolicy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 235 (1979) (arguing that predation requires market structure conducive to recoupment); Steven R. Beck,
Note, Intent as an Element of PredatoryPricingUnderSection 2 of the Sherman
Act, 76 CoRmELL L. REv. 1242, 1263-84 (1991) (discussing the usefulness of intent in antitrust law); Michael C. Quinn, Note, PredatoryPricingStrategies:
The Relevance of Intent UnderAntitrust, Unfair Competition,and Tort Law, 64
ST. JoHN's L. Rlv. 607, 613-22 (1990) (discussing the importance of intent in

antitrust).
208. But see The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV.L.
REv. 322, 328 (1993) (stating that after Brooke Group, "plaintiffs alleging a
predatory pricing scheme will be forced to present economic data rather than
elusive and slippery subjective evidence of 'predatory intent' "); Calkins, supra

note 203, at 403 ("The single clear lesson from the [1992] Term is that the movement toward antitrust objectivity continues.").
209. See supra part HI.B (discussing the Kodak holding).
210. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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failure to define "complex durable goods" relegates the difficult
task of fleshing out this distinction to the lower courts. 2 11 That
the proper reach of this new category is unclear further complicates this analysis. The connection that Kodak implies between
information gaps and complex products generally suggests that
informational imperfections can confer market power on small
firms in markets for equally complex non-durable goods.2 12
These difficulties, however, pale in comparison to the
problems of evaluating single-firm informational imperfections
and determining whether these imperfections generate market
power. Kodak requires that lower courts identify information
gaps, decide whether overcoming them is sufficiently "difficult
and costly" to create market power, and explore whether the efforts of sophisticated buyers or other competitors can defuse
these gaps. Thus, like Ticor and Brooke Group, Kodak announces tests that are new to antitrust, contain ambiguous terminology and demand lengthy factual investigation.
2. The New Complexity in Historical Perspective
Collectively, Ticor, Brooke Group, Kodak, and sophistication
doctrine represent the second phase of a movement toward a
more fact-intensive approach to antitrust. In the first phase, the
Supreme Court relaxed its reliance on the per se approach in
favor of Chicago's price-theoretic orientation. The second phase
marks the Court's abandonment of the simplifying, streamlining
assumptions that made Chicago administratively practicable.
The new antitrust jurisprudence thus promises complex factual
inquiry without the benefit of workable theoretical guidance.
In the past fifteen years, as it has come to favor rule-of-reason analysis,2 13 the Supreme Court has restricted the applicabil211. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Michael S. Jacobs, Market

Power Through Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposalfor Limiting
Them, 52 MD.L. REv. 336, 364-65 (1993).
212. Complexities in the markets for health care and legal services arguably
warrant the kind of concern voiced in Kodak. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim,

Blessed Be the Tie that Binds? Antitrust Perils of PhysicianInvestment and
Self-Referral, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 359 (1993) (arguing that information gaps and

the fiducial nature of the doctor-patient relationship can combine to confer market power on individual physicians, enabling them to refer patients to high-cost
diagnostic or laboratory facilities in which the physicians themselves have a
large financial stake).
213. The classic statement of the rule of reason appears in Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). It requires courts to
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is ap-
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ity of per se rules. 2 14 For instance, the Court has narrowed
2 15 It
proscriptions against vertical resale price maintenance.
has eased categorical prohibitions of group boycotts and tying
arrangements. 2 16 Furthermore, the Court has relaxed strict
facts
rules forbidding price-fixing 2 17 to permit "quick looks" into
218
that might justify otherwise impermissible agreements.
plied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. Judge Easterbrook has criticized this formulation as "empty" and "openended." Easterbrook, supra note 112, at 12.
214. Antitrust courts have developed two separate but complementary approaches to claims arising under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), which prohibits collective conduct in restraint of trade. Because
most business conduct restrains trade in some fashion, the Sherman Act has
long been held to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade. See Chicago
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238; see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the
Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
685, 689 (1991) (discussing the Sherman Acts application only to unreasonable
restraints on trade). Under the rule of reason, courts analyze allegations of
unlawful behavior by undertaking potentially wide-ranging factual inquiries
into the "competitive circumstances and justifications" of that behavior in order
to determine its reasonableness. Piraino, supra, at 689.
The per se rule developed partly in response to the burdensome factual inquiry the rule of reason required, and partly as a result of the judiciary's experience with certain kinds of restraints. Over time, the Supreme Court recognized
that some agreements, "because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue," should be "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable... without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Commentators have recognized that although this categorical
approach occasionally suffers from overbreadth, it reduces the time and expense of litigation and provides the business community with clear guidelines.
Piraino, supra, at 691-92.
215. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1986).
216. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,458-59 (1986) (discussing boycotts); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,293-98 (1985) (discussing boycotts); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (discussing tying
arrangements).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,226 n.
59 (1940) (referring to the pricing mechanism as "the central nervous system of
the economy").
218. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
100-01 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1,
20 (1979). The "quick look" seeks to strike a balance between per se and rule of
reason approaches to horizontal price-fixing cases. If defendant's business is
unfamiliar to antitrust courts or the price-fix is arguably justified by pro-competitive considerations, courts will take a "quick look" at the facts, to determine
whether competitive benefits might outweigh anticompetitive effects. If net
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The Court's decision to increase the use of the rule-of-reason, a method much-maligned for its indeterminacy,2 19 should
have generated additional administrative complexity. 220 This
complexity, however, failed to occur. Contemporaneous developments in antitrust philosophy, summary judgment law, and
politics 22 1 effectively reduced the number of antitrust trials and
tempered the administrative impact of a more expansive rule of
reason.
The revitalization of the rule of reason owed much to the
Chicago school 2 22 and its use of price theory to expose the flawed
2 23
economic premises underlying many of the old per se rules.
Chicagoans were dissatisfied with the rigor of industrial organibenefits appear plausible, courts apply the rule of reason; if not, they judge the
practice illegal per se. Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the ConstitutionalSherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REv. 263, 356-57 (1986).
219. See supra note 213 (discussing the classic statement of the rule of
reason).
220. Some per se rules remain. Still intact, although subject to heated debate, is the absolute proscription against vertical resale price maintenance. See
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990); Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988). For a review of the
debate, see generally Warren S. Grimes, The Seven Myths of Vertical PriceFixing: The Politicsand Economics of a CenturyLong Debate, 21 Sw. L. Rnv. 1285
(1992). Recently reaffirmed, the per se rule against horizontal division of territories seems firmly entrenched. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S.
46, 49-50 (1990).
221. Some commentators regarded the Reagan Administration as having intentionally narrowed the scope of antitrust enforcement to shelter big business
from government intervention, and argued that the Administration accomplished this goal through personnel changes and funding reductions in federal
enforcement agencies; efforts to amend antitrust legislation; and the appointment to the federal bench of Chicago school adherents. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Campbell, The Antitrust Record of the FirstReaganAdministration, 64 Tx. L.
Rv. 353, 354-55 (1985); Alan Fischer et al., PriceEffects of HorizontalMergers,
77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 784 n.25 (1989); William C. Kovacic, Public Choice and the
Public Interest: Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement During the
Reagan Administration,33 ANirrRusT BU=L. 467, 480-500 (1988); Ira M. Millstein & Jeffrey L. Kessler, The Antitrust Legacy of the ReaganAdministration,
33 ANTrRUST BULL. 505, 519-38 (1988).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 153-155. The Chicagoans' opposition to most rules of per se illegality led them to propose standards of per se
legality that flatly contradicted the teachings of the older rules. See Frank A.
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. CH. L. Rav.
263, 335 (1981) ("The same considerations that support rules of per se illegality
also support rules of per se legality"); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CH. L.
Rav. 6, 8 (1981) (arguing that rule of analysis reasoning does not offer sufficient
guidance for 'judges, juries, or the [FTC]").
223. See Bowc, supra note 153, at 116-33; Hovenkamp, supra note 149, at
226-33; Posner, supra note 153, at 925-33.
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zation economics, an industry-specific approach that animated
antitrust doctrine in the 1950s and '60s. 224 They offered formal,
theoretic explanations demonstrating that behaviors condemned
as unlawful per se often generated important economic efficiencies. 225 By encouraging courts to abandon per se rules and to
permit dominant firms to offer efficiency justifications for their
conduct, Chicagoans arguably encouraged an expansive application of the rule-of-reason and its more fact-intensive approach.
The Chicago school's simplifying theoretic assumptions,
however, countered its potential to complicate antitrust litigation. Chicago philosophy relied heavily on assumptions about
the workings of markets, the structural fragility of conspiracies,
and the role of new entry as a force for maintaining competition. 2 26 It consciously disregarded market imperfections that22it7
deemed immeasurable or impervious to judicial solution.
Chicagoans conceded that their assumptions were not perfectly
realistic 228 and lacked empirical support, 22 9 but contended that
and ease of application outtheir explanatory power, simplicity,
2 30
weighed such drawbacks.
224. For a discussion of Industrial Organization (1.0.) philosophy, see generally Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigmof IndustrialOrgan-

ization, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 487 (1983). 1.0. philosophy has been
summarized as follows: "The basic 1.0. ideas are, first, that industry details
have to be understood before policymakers can gain useful insights... and,
second, that an industry's structure influences the conduct of firms within it."
ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIvAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 112 (1989).

Chicagoans viewed the Industrial Organization approach as "un-theoretical, descriptive,... and even metaphorical." Posner, supra note 153, at 928.
Describing the bias of 1.0. economists, Ronald Coase remarked, "Cilf an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or another-that he does

not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation." Ronald Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in PoucY ISSUES AND RESEARCH
OPPORTUNrrIEs IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (V.R. Fuchs ed., 1972).
225. See Posner, supra note 153, at 926-33 (citing Chicago literature and
discussing the particulars of Chicago theory).
226. See Boax, supra note 153, at 263-79; Easterbrook, supra note 112, at 23, 5-7, 9.
227. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 17.
228. Id. at 16 ("[T]he assumptions of economic theory are one-dimensional
and pallid when viewed as descriptions of human behavior....").
229. See Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46
U. Cm. L. Rzv. 281, 292-94 (1979).
230. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 112, at 14-39 (discussing presumptions upon which to structure antitrust inquiry, and describing five filters to
proscribe inquiry in cases with "sufficiently small" impact on society); Richard
A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 313 (1975) ("Rebuttal based on ease of entry, economies
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Critics denounced the Chicago approach as "minimalist"2 3 '
and ideological. 23 2 Their overriding theme was that Chicago's
hidden ideological motivation biased its approach with assumptions that invariably justified pro-business outcomes2 33 and that
these assumptions were simplistic, not simple.23 4 Despite their
fundamental differences, however, Chicagoans and their critics
implicitly shared the view that antitrust must center around
simplifying assumptions that broadly explain the manifold
workings of the marketplace, obviate extensive factual inquiry,
and economize on the use of judicial resources. 23 5
Coinciding roughly with Chicago's emergence, the Supreme
Court's encouragement of an expanded use of summary judgment 23 6 further simplified the administration of the price-theoretic approach. As a result, the doctrinal and methodological
of scale, or managerial efficiencies should not be allowed, because these factors,
although clearly relevant to a correct evaluation of the competitive significance
of a merger, are intractable subjects for litigation."). In this respect, the Chicago school's concern for administrability was itself foreshadowed by the earlier
work of others. See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Mergingof Law and Economics, 74 HARv.L. Rav. 226, 227-28 (1960) (observing
that an objective in simplifying antitrust analysis is to aid judicial
administration).
231. See Fox & Pitofsky, supra note 153, at 958.
232. See Rudolph J. Peritz, The 'Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property
Logic in Restraintof Competition, 40 HASTiNGS L.J. 285, 336-41 (1989).
233. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 149, at 232 ("Outsiders regard [the]
Chicago School claim of freedom from political interest with a good deal of skepticism, and some believe it to be simple hogwash, or perhaps even a cover for a
very strong, probusiness political bias that works to the benefit of the rich.");
Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in the GrayAreas of Antitrust:
The Dismantlingof Vertical RestraintsRegulation, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 1, 7
(1992) ("Chicago School analysts often give scholars the impression of instinctively condoning business strategies and then developing post-hoc efficiency arguments to justify those positions.").
234. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The "Is"and "Ought' of Vertical RestraintsAfter Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CoR=LL L. REv.1095, 112125 (1986) (criticizing the "preconceived substantive rules" of the Chicago school
and its inattention to factual and policy concerns); Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle
for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 917, 919, 922-23 (1987) (arguing that
antitrust policy should focus not only on the questions of allocative efficiency
raised by Chicago, but also on goals of fairness, consumer choice, product innovation, decentralized decisionmaking, and the continued economic independence of small business).
235. See Easterbrook, supra note 167, at 1706 (discussing the need to simplify antitrust analysis); Fox, supra note 234, at 919, 922-23 (discussing the
benefits of antitrust analysis as espoused by the Chicago school's critics). For a
more complete description of this debate, see Hovenkamp, supra note 149, at
226-55. Professor Hovenkamp, who describes himself as a centrist, acknowledges that the largest virtue of the Chicago school "is its simplicity." Id. at 224.
236. See supra part IV.C.1 (discussing summary judgment).
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complexities potentially inherent in Chicago jurisprudence
failed to materialize.
Unlike the philosophies of the Chicago school and its critics,
the new jurisprudence of Ticor, Brooke Group,Kodak, and corporate sophistication abandons streamlining assumptions in favor
of intensive factual investigations. The importance that sophistication places on firm-specific rationality, for example, will immerse antitrust in the kind of administrative complications that
Chicago and its critics sought to avoid. Furthermore, its emphasis on the impact of market imperfections will threaten the viability of those few economic assumptions still intact.2 37 Thus,
unlike the Chicago school approach, the new jurisprudence is
truly complex.
CONCLUSION: CYCLICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
FUTURE OF ANTITRUST
Seen in perspective, the hyper-complexity of current antitrust represents a predictable phase in a jurisprudential cycle.
Modern antitrust jurisprudence has regularly adopted highly assumptive modes of analysis, only to reject them for more factintensive methodologies. Each theory has been attacked, moreover, for embodying the political biases of its authors. Thirty
years ago, for example, antitrust courts employed the industrial
organization model, with its assumptions about the effects of
firm size, concentration levels, exclusive contracting, and vertical arrangements. Price theorists criticized this model as
counter-factual and as more political than economic. 2 38 In turn,
as price theory achieved preeminence, critics bemoaned the
political content of its assumptions and denounced its inattention to market imperfections and empirical data.23 9 Having
failed to command lasting consensus, these philosophies have
237. One of these is the static market assumption, defined by Professor
Hovenkamp as "a premise that the market being examined is unaffected by external events." Hovenkamp, supra note 149, at 256. Markets are certainly dynamic in fact, but measuring and weighing their dynamic elements would
burden antitrust courts tremendously. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals recently chastised the Justice Department for adopting a static
model of market demand in a merger challenge, assuming itself-without explanation-that demand in the relevant market would continue to grow.
United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 667 n.13 (9th Cir. 1990).
238. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 153, at 418-25 (discussing political trends);
Posner, supra note 153, at 928-33 (criticizing the Industrial Organization model
as "inconsistent with economic theory").
239. See supra text accompanying notes 153-155, 222-235 (discussing the
Chicago school and its critics).
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given way for the time being to the intensive empiricism of the
new jurisprudence. This approach arguably combines new economic theory with fact-intensive inquiries into the workings of
specific markets.
The political biases and perceived empirical shortcomings of
the earlier philosophies may have sparked recent interest in a
more fact-specific jurisprudence and in the seemingly apolitical
strategic models of the post-Chicago scholars. Judicial attempts
to apply the new approach, however, have exposed its serious
definitional ambiguities, methodological problems, and administrative costs. The litigation process has proved that, at least in
certain respects, post-Chicago theory is unworkable in practice.
Indeed, the most valuable lesson of the new sophistication ultimately may be that, at a certain point, an increasingly factual
inquiry does more harm than good.
This is not to suggest that antitrust should blind itself to
commercial reality. Modern antitrust has always been fact-intensive, 240 and the expanded use of the rule of reason will keep
it that way. 24 1 No jurisprudence, however, can or should con-

sider all potentially relevant facts. More importantly, no jurisprudence can function effectively without the theoretical
guidance that powerful assumptions provide. Jurisprudence
needs such assumptions to organize fact-finding into a manageable task and to provide a philosophical framework into which
relevant facts can fit meaningfully.
The new sophistication fails not simply because it requires
the open-ended pursuit of fact. It fails because, by rejecting the
rationality assumption, it shatters the world of relevant commercial data into millions of tiny fragments and disassembles
the theoretical framework that might piece them together. Just
as theory cannot function without factual context, fact becomes
meaningless in a theoretical void.
240. See Arthur, supra note 218, at 303-04 (stating that the complexity associated with defining the market and evaluating market power "make virtually all data relevant"); Easterbrook, supra note 112, at 11-13 (observing that
antitrust's vague rules prompt diligent and lengthy discovery); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. Ray. 1, 10-17 (1978) (observing generally the
complexity of antitrust inquiry following Sylvania).
241. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or
Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust Standardfor Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L.
Rv. 1, 13-14 & n.54 (1991) (describing the delineation of relevant product and
geographic markets, the assessment of market share, and the prediction of the
extent to which mergers will increase market concentration as "fact-intensive
and time-consuming" determinations).
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Perhaps there is a message in this failure. Even before the
arrival of sophistication and despite their political differences,
the Chicago school and its critics shared a deep appreciation for
the economizing features of simplifying assumptions. Both recognized, for example, that the extreme length, expense, and
complexity of antitrust trials require sacrificing comprehensive
factual accuracy for the benefits of neat explanatory assumptions. Both acknowledged the importance of enforcing antitrust
philosophies driven by powespoused
efficiently. Both therefore 24
2
erful theoretical premises.
This shared history argues now for a return to the jurispru:
dential past. Aware of the limits of atheoretical complexity, antitrust should concern itself anew with fashioning assumptions
that capture its policy purposes simply and efficiently. Scholars,
of course, will continue to differ over what these purposes should
be. The failure of sophistication, however, should convince them
that the future of antitrust lies not with more facts but with new
assumptions.

242. Compare a Chicago Critic, for example, Robert Pitofsky, supra note
116, at 1489 ("Per se rules represent a recognition that (1) antitrust trials, absent a per se approach, are long, expensive, and complex, (2) efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws is a justifiable policy goal, and (3) there is a virtue in
telling businessmen accurately and precisely the location of legal limits on business conduct.") with a Chicagoan, for example, Easterbrook, supra note 167, at
1706 ("What's wrong with models that contain 'unrealistic' assumptions?...
Without simplification we do not know what to look for. Any approach to antitrust must simplify; modeling is essential; the best model is the simplest one
that can cope with the data.").

